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Abstract 
The Kenyan political practice has historically been characterized by restriction and 
sometimes repression of space for and practice of political participation by the ‘ordinary 
people’. This thesis is a case study of the Nairobi based group Bunge la Mwananchi (BLM), 
which translates into People’s Parliament. The core of the BLM is the practice of critical 
public deliberation and political mobilization, as two mutually reinforcing practices. This is 
explored and understood as at once a political education and a form of political participation, 
where the activists then become facilitators of demand-driven situated critical learning 
processes, which simultaneously contribute to building critical aware constituency of a 
movement with the aim of social transformation and the development of a relevant and 
radical African democracy. Conceptualizing social transformation, the thesis draws on 
Thomas Nail’s Constructive Strategies for social transformation. The thesis also draws on 
Ernest Wamba-dia-wamba’s Pan-African writings on Palaver as popular democracy and 
Paulo Freire’s Critical Pedagogy of emancipatory praxis, which combines reflection through 
dialogue and action through political mobilization. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis is a case study of the Nairobi based group Bunge la Mwananchi (BLM), which 
translates into People’s Parliament. It is based on a five week field visit in June and July 
2013. BLM is a phenomenon of critical public deliberation as well as an amorphous group 
of ordinary citizens gathering in Jeevanjee Gardens, downtown Nairobi. There are multiple 
formations and identities within in BLM Jeevanjee Gardens and in this thesis I have chosen 
to focus on a loosely delimited formation of radicals, which perceives BLM as a social 
movement. They roughly characterize it as a social movement, as oppose to mainstream 
civil society counting registered civil society organization, Moreover, this definition 
distinguish them from other groups in the BLM, because they argues that the critical 
deliberations are not only an end per se, but also inherently an offset for political 
mobilization. This conception of BLM as a social movement, which is only one of many 
possible conceptions and identities existing in the BLM, but this will be basis for this report.  
The impetus for this thesis was a curiosity towards Kenyan political culture and the space 
for and practice of political participation by the Kenyan citizens. Guided by the empirical 
findings, I seek to position this thesis in the discussion of participatory democratic practice 
and radical social transformation, driven from below.    
1.1 Field of Research 
2013 was the jubilee of Kenyan independence. Taking stock of the social and democratic 
development of the country, the BLM launched a campaign under the banner ‘50 years of 
shame’. As Kenya enjoys a constitutional democracy, and an overall increase in democratic 
space for civic organization over the last the 50 years (Kalra, 2013), Kenya has also been 
marked by a continuing ‘policy of order’ by the government, in which social and political 
rights have been suppressed in the name of stability and development (Nasong’o, 2007). In 
2010 the Kenyan people voted yes to a new and progressive Constitution. This was a 
benchmark in the Kenyan political history and democratic development. However, the 
constitutional democracy must still be seen as in a phase of implementation, which will be 
elaborated in the coming chapters. Moreover, it becomes relevant to ask, what kind of 
democracy we are talking about. A Kenyan radical formulates it as follows:  
“When we talk about promoting democracy in Africa, the first question is: whose democracy? 
… Democracy must be a participatory process; it cannot be a one time, every five year 
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event. That does not work in Africa. The story needs to change. Democracy in Africa must 
come from the ordinary people of Africa”  
(Patita Tingoi, Fahamu1, recording) 
Patita’s critique resonates among the BLM activists. Springing from this societal analysis by 
the activists, the theoretical basis for this thesis draws on radical, Pan-African scholars’ 
critique of an attempted application of a bourgeois and Western originating liberal 
democracy, and a call for an alternative ‘real’ - inclusive - African democracy. Moreover, 
such a political practice must be developed from and by the organizing practices of the 
people affected (Aké, 1993; Nail, 2010).  
The essence of BLM is sub-altern public deliberation. This can be perceived at once a form 
of popular education and a social movement (Wamba-dia-wamba, 1985). In this praxis of 
critical reflection and collective action, the BLM draws on local indigenous or ancestral 
traditions of community deliberation, formulated in a progressive Pan-African discourse and 
combines it with inspiration from global progressive organizing such as the horizontal, 
leaderless organization, from Latin American movements and the Arab Spring and the 
human rights discourse (Surtherland, Land & Bohm, 2013: 1). With this approach, the 
movements engage not only in criticizing the present system, but also in development of an 
inclusive and socially just democratic practice. They thereby seek to participate 
constructively and prefiguratively in the renegotiation of the present political practice and 
push towards a radicalized participatory and relevant democracy for and by the ordinary 
people.  
Hence, to sum up, this thesis seeks to explore a struggle towards a contextual and 
participatory democracy, drawing on radical and Pan-African scholarly perspectives on 
strategies for social transformation and praxis of popular education. The aim of this study is 
not to criticize or evaluate the movement or its strategies, but rather to explore the political 
project and the approach of this core group of activists, to contribute to a conversation on 
how transformative change is created. 
                                            
1 Fahamu - network for social justice 
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1.2 Research question 
On that basis, this study is dedicated to answering the following research question:  
How can the BLM practice be understood as a praxis of conscientization and how can 
this process be understood as a strategy for social transformation? 
This thesis is guided by the empirical data, which has produced a quite eclectic theoretical 
framework. The research question refers to Paolo Freire’s (1993) understanding of praxis, 
which is the dialectical process between reflection and action rooted in and in reaction to 
one’s own oppressed situation, which catalyzes the development of conscientización - 
critical awareness. I supplement this with Thomas Nail’s (2010) analytical framework for 
analyzing constructive strategies for radical social transformation. Finally, I will draw on 
Wamba-dia-wamba (1985) and Aké (1993) in the conceptualization of a contextually 
relevant radical democratic practice.  
1.3 Flow of the Report  
Chapter one introduces and frames the field of research and presents the research question. 
Chapter two unfolds the methodological considerations and the choices. Chapter three 
provides a background introduction to Bunge la Mwananchi as a concept and a movement 
respectively. Chapter four provides a historical context focusing on the relation between ‘the 
rulers and the ruled’ and the popular struggle for space for political participation and 
deliberation. Moreover, this chapter introduces the historical tradition for public deliberation. 
Based on a number of case examples chapter five provides an analysis of the BLM approach 
to social transformation, based on the deliberative practice in Jeevanjee Gardens. This 
analysis draws on different theoretical conceptions to elaborate the discussion of ‘an African 
democracy’, ‘popular education’ as an approach to ‘constructive strategies for social 
transformation’. In continuation of the analysis in chapter five, chapter six aims to introduce 
and analyze a selection of examples of political mobilizations by the movement, to discuss 
how they play into the strategy elaborated in chapter five. Finally, chapter seven sums up 
the concluding reflections based in the analysis.  
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2 Methodological Considerations 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the main methodological considerations and choices in 
relation to this thesis. I will present the choice of case, research approach and the empirical 
data as well as theoretical considerations, which this thesis is based on.  
This thesis is based on a five weeks field study conducted from 3 June till 8 July 2013. The 
lion’s share of the fieldwork was conducted in collaboration with Ida Dalgaard Steffensen. 
We initiated the thesis writing process together; therefore there can be overlaps, primarily 
up until the analysis. When explaining the data collection I will sometimes use ‘we’, which 
refers to Ida and I. 
2.1. Choice of case and research approach 
My motivation for this research stems from curiosity about ordinary people’s political 
participation and urban Kenyan political culture. Bunge la Mwananchi is one of the most 
vocal citizens’ voices in Nairobi, and I find it particularly interesting case due to the character 
of the movement that is formed around critical public deliberation and an open membership 
based on participation. Moreover, the inherent politics of difference in the practice holds 
interesting prefigurative aspects and opens door for alternative and constructive strategies 
to push for transformational change. Hence, the impetus for this research process is dual to 
me, as it is based on an academic curiosity about how popular organization and mobilization 
can contribute to social transformation as well as a personal enthusiasm for political 
organization and a wish to be inspired. The aim of this study is not to criticize or evaluate 
the movement or its strategies, rather to explore the political project and the approach of 
this core group of activists in particular, to contribute to discussion on how to create 
transformative change. 
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Based on the data collected, we identified a core and a periphery, when perceiving the BLM 
as a social movement. The core was made up of the activist group. The periphery is in this 
thesis understood as the members participating in the deliberations in Jeevanjee Gardens 
at large, these members perceive the participation in the public deliberations as the end in 
itself, whereas the core perceives the public deliberations as essential but not only in order 
to form and exchange opinions but also as a basis to act on this and hence a platform for 
political mobilization. This is two forms of political participation that should not be understood 
hierarchical, but supplementing. Core and periphery should therefore not be understood 
hierarchically, but rather as a matter of ideological coherence (Wenger, 1998: 108-9).  
In this thesis, I will focus on the agency of the ‘political core’ who I refer to as ‘activists’ and 
the quoted BLM members are hence part of this category. However, the remainder of 
collected data served as background knowledge for the analysis. The reference term 
activists should be seen as an analytical category. Internally they often identify as radicals 
or human rights defenders - the latter is often also used externally. Some use the term 
‘activists’, whereas others distance themselves from this reference, because they feel it has 
become associated with professional civil society and economically compensated 
mobilization. When ‘doing politics’, for example interacting with authorities or media, the 
activists will most often introduce themselves as ‘ordinary citizens’, ‘concerned citizens’, or 
‘members of the people’s parliament’. There are many conceptualizations of what a social 
movement is. I delimit myself from this discussion by accepting the core group of activists’ 
self-perception of the BLM as a social movement. The content of this will be elaborated in 
the report. 
This thesis is a case study of Bunge la Mwananchi as a social movement. I perceive the 
BLM as a ‘critical case’ due to its core of public deliberation and membership by 
participation, through which indigenous and international traditions of organizing are fused, 
deconstructed and redeveloped and makes basis for what I see as a prefigurative approach 
to developing a contextually relevant democracy (Darke et al., 1998: 277). My choice of a 
single case design is reasoned by a wish to conduct an in depth investigation of the micro-
sociological processes in BLM to gain insights to the de-constructing and re-constructing of 
power structures, individual and collective agency and the development of political culture 
evolving in BLM.  
The empirical data and the processing of this has been directing the development of the 
analysis of this thesis. It has further informed the selection of theory, which has produced a 
quite eclectic theoretical frame. I will get more into the theoretical considerations in section 
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2.2. Interlinked with its empirical guidance, this study is invariably biased by my 
preconceptions as well as my political and academic schooling (Rendtorff in Fuglsang et al., 
2007: 248-9). On that basis, this thesis finds inspiration in the adductive methodology, which 
has been described as a way of capturing the dialectical shuttling between the domain of 
observation and the domain of ideas (Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont, 2003: 149) as a 
dynamic process moving between pre-existing knowledge, development of analytical tools 
and patterns and possible explanations based on both data and theory. Hence, I have 
observed and interviewed members of the movement, sought to make sense and 
conceptualize the findings, drawing on tendencies, theories and previous experiences to 
return and test these developed thesis and concepts with the movement. This process 
canbe summed up as a reflexive abductive judgement in the interaction between structures 
of meaning and actors (Rendtorff in Fuglsang et al., 2007: 249).  
2.2 Empirical Data 
The sources of empirical data, which this thesis is based on, include individual semi-
structured and unstructured/informal interviews with individuals as well as groups, 
participant observations and organizational documents. Moreover, I have followed the 
coverage in mainstream media and new social media in the period of data collection, which 
especially covers the political mobilizations and direct actions of the movement. The use of 
various methods, are meant to make up for any weaknesses in the different methods 
separately. Referring to the mentioned multiplicity of qualitative methods, this study can be 
characterized as a form of micro-ethnography (Wolcott, 1995 in Bryman, 2004: 293). 
2.2.1. Reflections of data collection and possible impacts  
Our approach to finding respondents has been both explorative and focused. We were 
introduced to the movement through the writings of and conversations with the Danish 
scholar, Jacob Rasmussen, who kindly shared his contacts to activists from the movement. 
The main part of our respondents as well as observations have been based on snowballing, 
which happened in our initiative as well as through members of BLM, who on their own 
initiative introduced us to people who were central to the movement or had other relevant 
perspectives on it (Bryman, 2004: 100-102). In addition, we have sought to introduce 
ourselves more broadly to the movement and diversify our respondents. An example of this 
is by participating in the deliberations in Jeevanjee without the core group being present and 
approaching members as follow up on observations. Finally, we made a number of 
background interviews with civil society organization (CSO) professionals; Nairobi based 
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scholars and identified other activist, individuals and formations based on mainstream 
media2.  
I have anonymized some of the respondents, hence the names referred to in the report can 
be randomly selected common local names. However, each name corresponds to a 
respondent. This is done on request of the respondents, based on their own evaluation of 
their safety. As this indirectly affects the reader’s ability to identify all the respondents, I want 
to mention that most of the respondents insisted on using their own names and perceived 
the interaction with us and the following documentation of their agency as a part of their 
struggle. In continuation of that, we sought to clarify and align expectations before every 
interview, observation or conversation. As a result, no one has had the right to review or 
approve the writings. If I during the thesis refer to people that have chosen to be anonymous 
also to me, it will be clearly stated in the text.  
2.2.2. Empirical methodology  
We have conducted a number of individual, semi-structured interviews. The interview guides 
can be found in appendix along with the field trip calendar, field notes and recordings. These 
interviews were supplemented by a number of informal interviews and conversations with 
individuals and groups. In total we have 52 recorded interviews. The individual semi-
structured interviews provides a combination of comparable information (for example gender 
and age as well as motivation for participation and other more elaborated themes), moreover 
the semi-structured interview provides latitude to probe into the answers and enter into a 
dialogue with the respondent. This form allows the respondents to influence the course of 
the interview while still structured by the interviewer (May, 2001: 123; Olsen & Pedersen, 
2008: 240). The semi-structured interviews were used both for ‘insiders’ from the movement 
and background interviews with other activists in Nairobi, NGO workers and academics 
which assisted the understanding of BLM directly as well as Kenyan political history and 
culture. The informal or unstructured interviews, as well as  the observations, allowed issues 
that immediately seemed to be diverging from the research focus to appear and were hence 
affecting the course of the research (May, 2001: 124). As an example, the eminent role of 
                                            
2For example the national newspaper ‘the Standard’ published a feature on ‘The New Leading 
Activists in Nairobi’2 which listed a number of profiled Kenyan activists, whom we succeeded in 
meeting with most. Read more at: 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/entertainment/pulse/article/350/the-new-leading-activists-in-
nairobi' 14.03.04 
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criminalization of activists and state led assaults’ effect on the political participation evolved 
through the informal encounters, and were then later followed up in more structured 
interviews. Another example of this is elaborate local organizing based on housing rights 
campaign or class struggles within tribal or identity based communities. This was mentioned 
coincidently – and then we asked into it in later interviews.  
Kvale (1994: 134) highlights the importance of considering the setting when conducting 
interviews, to make sure that the respondent or respondents feel safe to speak freely. As 
most informal conversations happened ‘on the road’ from one place to another or 
spontaneously in other ways, it was a central consideration in the arranged semi-structured 
interviews. The constant concern by the activists about surveillance and infiltration by 
government agents meant that arranged interviews would typically be conducted in one of 
the Hotel cafeterias in the area around Jeevanjee gardens. To share coffee moreover served 
as a way of showing our gratitude for the activist’s time.  
Tim May (2001) described the role of the participating observer as ‘becoming a fan’ who 
desires to know and understand more about the people in the setting, but does not seek to 
become one of them. Hence, we sought to become some degree of ‘accepted part of the 
group’ and as part of this shared our own stories and impetus, without the disillusion of 
’becoming one of them’ (p. 156) and sought not to be judgmental or provoking in our 
utterances, to minimize our opinions and values shaping the conversations – well aware that 
a fusion of horizons are inherent in dialogue. Participating as observers we were overt and 
made our role and presence clear when relevant and possible (Bryman, 2004: 195-7). Due 
to the nature of the BLM this catalyzed repeating “interrogations” or vying processes, where 
the ‘crowd’ – everyone present at the BLM location in Jeevanjee Garden - were communally 
interviewing us on our intentions and whatever the present group found relevant. These 
sessions typically focused on our motivation, political convictions were, whether we were 
agents of the state or particular interests groups or the off set for a discussion of the Global 
South North relation.  
Being an outsider to the field of research can both be a hindrance and an advantage. It gives 
you a lesser understanding of the context and history, but on the other hand potentially a 
chance to see things more from a distance than an insider could.  Being an outsider, in this 
case also meant being young, European, middle-class women in a male dominated, Kenyan 
community, with a high level of poverty. We have sought to maneuver reflexively in this 
throughout the field trip. Our aim was primarily to listen and even when engaging in 
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discussions, especially towards the end of the field trip, we entered discussion with 
questions or challenges to the statements rather than to state our own positions. As it will 
be elaborated in the analysis, interrogation of newcomers are an inherent part of the BLM 
and in such situations we have been honest about our own values including our fundamental 
sympathetic stand with BLM practice, but also explicit about our position as researchers and 
our wish to stay in a somewhat observant role. Moreover, when we aired personal views we 
aimed to position them in a cultural context. In this way we aimed for our viewpoints to be 
subjects for discussion rather than a party to the discussion. For example on sexuality and 
gender identities, when asked I would say, that I believe that sexuality is private and I believe 
that it is a human right to be who you are. In my country for example gay marriage are 
ensured by law. In addition, it is interesting for me, to try to understand the different lines of 
arguments here… That would be a quite provoking statement, typically setting of a 
discussion on the cultural history of sexuality in Kenya, whether the Constitution protects 
sexual and gender minorities or similar topics.  
In the field notes I have divided between observations, which are primarily tacit affected by 
our presence, and conversations in which we take active part (Bryman, 2004: 500). 
Language was, however, a natural constraint as the primary language among the activists 
and in the deliberation in BLM Jeevanjee was Sheng, a creole dialect drawing on English, 
Swahili and local languages. Most often the group would change into English as we entered, 
however, this invariably affected social dynamics, because of the explication of our 
presence, but also because many of the members and activists from the lower societal strata 
did not speak English, or do not speak English as well as Sheng, and were hence excluded 
from or handicapped in the conversation. For the same reason some members as a matter 
of principle choose not to change language in spite of our presence. This same group of 
members refused to participate in interviews and, for most of the time, to interact with us at 
all. Hence there is a small, but to my impression strongly ideologically respected group within 
the core that were not part of our study of the BLM, which off course potentially affects the 
perspective study.       
2.3 Theoretical Considerations 
The abductive approach and the empirical bias of this thesis produce a quite eclectic 
theoretical framework, which draws on a number of ideas and conceptualizations that serves 
to substantiate and elaborate findings. I draw on three main strands of theoretical concepts, 
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which are firstly, ‘participatory democracy’, secondly, ‘strategies for radical social 
transformation’ and thirdly, ‘critical pedagogy’. 
 2.3.1. Participatory democracy 
Lending Thomas Nail’s guiding question I seek to look at “the structure or political order 
particular to actual radical organizations not just possible ones?” (Nail 2010: 8). The focus 
on the actual reality, rather than an ideal or generalized truth of the same and an inherent 
critique of that line of scholarly practice is general for the scholarly literature that this thesis 
builds on. In the quest to analyze the ‘actual existing reality’, I have sought to draw on 
scholarly works that are based on the political culture in the region or arguably comparable 
inspirational settings.  
Democratic transformation and consolidation of a new political culture after transition to 
democracy in constitutional terms require an active, participatory, and a critical civil society 
to complement the procedural democracy. Participatory process presupposes some kind of 
deliberative culture and practice (Harrebye, 2012: 20-23). Thus the development of a public 
sphere, in which citizens are free to deliberate on their positions and engage the state and 
organize in civil society organizations and social movements is essential (cf. Linz and 
Stepan, 1996 in Kaarsholm, 2009: 411). Several normative models have been proposed 
about the public sphere. The ideal of a public sphere presented by Jürgen Habermas (1962; 
1989) has had a major influence on the conception of the ‘public sphere’ and laid the 
foundation for the ‘participatory model of democracy’. Habermas explores the conditions for 
inter-subjective dialogue, where the outcome is based on reasoning rather than power, in 
an institutional landscape of openness and unrestricted debate and accessibility. This notion 
has since been criticized, also by himself, for being an ideal and based in a historical and 
class specific setting of the bourgeoisie of the 18th and 19th century in Europe. Yet, the 
Habermasian notion continues to function as a critical ideal which the actual organization of 
publics in different situations of development may be assessed against (Kalra, 2012: 14; 
Harrabye, 2012: 23; Kaarsholm, 2012: 411).  
2.3.2. Strategies for radical social transformation. 
In the exploration of the public meeting of citizens’ deliberation as a means of political 
participation I draw on Haugerud’s seminal descriptions of the Baraza in Kenya and 
Rasmussen and Omanga’s (2012) analysis of the Kamukunji (gathering) culture and BLM 
in particular. Moreover, I utilize the concept of palaver. The concept has been criticized for 
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its negative connotations, so without exhausting the linguistic discussion I want to clarify that 
I in this thesis use the term not in the sense of ‘meaningless verbosity’ or idle talk, but as 
defined by Robert Armstrong:   
“An open debate during which each participant, regardless of age or rank, expresses his or 
her opinion on the problem being discussed until the entire family or community reaches a 
general consensus”  
(Armstrong, 1979: 11) 
“In the political and social thinking of traditional Africa the Palaver bears message of 
democracy.”(P. Kanoute in Diong, 1979: 79). There is little scholarly scrutiny of the concept 
of palaver, as Armstrong (1979) reviews in his article on the public meeting as a means of 
participation in political and social activities in Africa. In the same anthology the different 
traditions of the public meeting are presented, spreading from a collective decision making 
forum, institutions for political struggle to forums for conflict resolution counting for example 
patriarchal forums, gerontocracies, and all-inclusive horizontal meetings (Armstrong, 1979: 
Nyangena, 2003; Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012). The literature on palaver utilized, draw on 
the progressive Pan-African discourse. There is no one definition or periodization of Pan-
Africanism, but unity of Sub-Saharan countries, ‘self-governance’ – the rejection of foreign 
domination and African influence in the world covers some of the reemerging descriptions 
(Simala, 2003: 20). In the wave of decolonization in the 1960 the notion of a just and 
democratic pre-colonial tradition of governance flourished. Among the luminaries were 
Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, who served as the first Presidents in Tanzania and 
Kenya respectively. 
“We in Africa, have no more need of being ‘converted’ to socialism than we have of being 
‘taught’’ democracy. Both are rooted in our own past - in the traditional society which 
produced us”  
(Nyerere, 1968: 62) 
Wamba-dia-Wamba (1985) presents palaver as a social movement, a mass education and 
popular democracy echoing socialist and radical democratic conceptions, based on pre-
colonial traditions among the Kongo speaking people in Congo, Angola and Zaire. He is 
hesitant in determining when this tradition emerged, but some link it to the ‘mystical ancient 
time of the ancestors’ (Wamba-dia-wamba, 1985: 5). Wamba-dia-wamba has been criticized 
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for glorifying the past (Depelchin, 2005 chp. 8), I will not go into an examination of the 
historical accuracy of this concept, but rather utilize it and demonstrate how I see the idea 
resonates in the ideals of practice in the BLM. 
2.3.3. Critical Pedagogy 
As highlighted by Wamba-dia-wamba (1985) the palaver among other things function as a 
form of popular education. The Brazilian educator and activists Paulo Freire (1970; 1986) is 
with his Pedagogies of the Oppressed often seen as one of the founding fathers of the critical 
pedagogies. His conceptual framework served to illuminate the micro-sociological 
processes in the dialogue based organizing and mobilizing of oppressed groups. Where 
Paulo Freire takes point of departure in his practice as adult educator, Griffen Foley’s field 
of study is learning in social movements and community organizing in East Africa and Latin 
America (Foley, 1998; 1999; 2001). Like Foley, I moreover combine the critical pedagogy 
and with the later community of practice and situated learning as presented by Lave and 
Wenger (1991), by which they provide a terminology for understanding these micro-
sociological processes of construction and socializations through individual and collective 
learning and structural change through negotiation of meaning in practice. Shared for these 
different representatives of critical pedagogies is their Marxist off set. 
Looking at the strategies for radical social transformation I draw on Thomas Nail (2010; 
2012). He takes point of departure in the post-structuralist thinkers Gilles Deleuze, Albano 
Guattari and the praxis of the popular movement the Zapatistas3. In spite of the geographical 
gap I find the offset in the Zapatistas relevant, because the movements shares the 
reflections of socialist and anarchist ideas, ideologically rejects political classification and 
cherishes indigenous or ancestral traditions as well as inclusive communal values.  
 
 
  
                                            
3The Zapatistas are officially The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional, EZLN). They organize and mobilize the marginalized indigenous population in Chiapas, Mexico. 
Although the ideology of the EZLN is reflective of libertarian socialism and anarchism in many respects, the 
EZLN has rejected and defied political classification, retaining its distinctiveness due in part to the importance 
of indigenous Mayan beliefs in Zapatismo thought. The EZLN aligns itself with the wider international alter-
globalization, anti-imperialist and anti-neo-liberal, seeking indigenous control over their local resources, 
especially land 
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3 Bunge la Mwananchi - the Parliament of the people 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a basic introduction to Bunge la Mwananchi (BLM) and 
to set a stage on the BLM in this report.  
Bunge La Mwananchi (BLM) is Swahili and translates to People’s Parliament. Colloquially it 
is often referred to as ‘Bunge’ which is a term that will appear in this thesis. BLM is an idea 
and a movement; it is the concept of coming together for critical public deliberation. It is also 
a concrete movement of people, struggling for social justice based on a hybrid of vernacular 
traditions, local and international inspiration. There are numerous more or less established 
people’s parliaments, people’s councils and grassroots assemblies across Nairobi and 
across Kenya. During the field trip I visited five active BLM groups (Jeevanjee Garden, 
Mombasa BLM, Kaptempwa, Nakuru and Kayole) and interviewed active members from five 
others (Nairobi II, Mathare, the Women’s Parliament, Kilifi, Mombasa people’s council). 
Moreover Rasmussen and Young, Rasmussen and Omanga and Kalra have described 
additional BLM groups in Kisumu and Eldoret in their writings. This will serve as background 
and perspectival material, the analysis of this thesis focuses on the BLM in Jeevanjee 
Gardens, Nairobi. I have chosen to focus on one, to be able to dig deeper with the aim of 
this analysis is to explore how the processes of learning and citizens’ organizing takes place. 
I have chosen Jeevanjee, because it is the most established and most well-known, it 
functions as central coordination for those who seek to strengthen the network between the 
BLMs across Kenya and because it has an explicit focus on doing away with tribalism and 
contributing to the development of participatory democracy in a united Kenya. The BLM in 
Jeevanjee has an explicit activist approach with a strong ‘political wing’, which will be central 
to my analysis of the BLM. 
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3.1 The origin of Bunge la Mwananchi in Jeevanjee Gardens 
 
The movement springs from a Kenyan tradition of coming together in the public space; on 
street corners, market places or under a tree, to discuss pertinent community issues (BLM, 
2010: 12; Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012). During colonialism and again during President 
Moi's rule, this tradition was suppressed, and the political gatherings were reduced to a 
minimum and went underground. The activities retracted, especially to the Jeevanjee 
Gardens in the center of the capital Nairobi (BLM, 2010: 12; several interviews). Hence, 
BLM emerged during the Moi regime, as one of the few avenues for public deliberation 
(Kalra, 2012: 8). 
Since the 1990s the daily gatherings in Jeevanjee Gardens have attracted crowds during 
lunch break hours and earned the name: 'Kikao cha Mwananchi' which is Swahili for 'the 
citizens' gathering. “Debates were conducted on two benches facing each other, where the 
moderator sat in the middle on a makeshift seat of stone brick and the audience crowds 
milling around them” (BLM, 2010: 12). It has developed into a well-known platform for 
subaltern political dialogue. By 2003 it began to be known by the trademark name 'Bunge 
La Mwananchi'. The movement got its name when they organized a mock election of the 
general elections in 2002. The message was that that BLM represents the people by a 
leadership elected through transparent processes, unlike the actual parliament (Kimari & 
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Rasmussen, 2010: 139; Oyayo Owinba, recording). I will return to the actual mandate of this 
elected leadership in the analysis. 
This gathering in Jeevanjee Gardens Park continues to be the physical manifestation of the 
BLM today. On a weekday, a couple of hundred people pass through the area4 to get 
updated, to relax or debate, mobilize or some other reason. “There are as many motivations 
to come to Bunge as there are members” (Gacheke Gachihi, field notes). Space is essential. 
During the field visit the activist, Gacheke, repeatedly emphasized that the location is 
essential ‘when building a movement’, because this is how it manifests its history, motivates 
action, recruits new members, and furthermore how it manages to reappear every time the 
power-holders have attempted to crush the movement, as it ensures that participants 
reappear here after being dispersed. Moreover, the space facilitates the open form of 
membership, which is pivotal for the movement. Hence the space of BLM is connected to a 
particular practice.  
3.2 The Members and Membership 
As a rule, everyone is welcome in BLM, regardless of gender, ethnic or religious background 
or political affiliation (Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012). From the beginning of the new 
millennium BLM has gained increased popularity among progressive students, university 
intellectuals, politicians as well as workers, peasants and unemployed (BLM 2010: 12). 
According to Kimari & Rasmussen (2010), as well as interviews, the majority of the 
participants are unemployed or hawkers. They are seeking a space to air and share their 
views with peers on social and political aspects of life. To some of the members, BLM 
becomes ‘a family’, this is where they find consolation or sympathy and they come here 
when things get difficult (Dinah, former president of BLM, recording). 
The informal membership is essential to BLM. Membership is based on participation and 
personal commitment. To be able to vote at the elections every other year, one has to 
register and some even developed membership cards, while others feel strongly against this 
practice. “Some of us work for the government. I work at the state house and have been 
active member of Bunge for many years” (field notes) an anonymous member told me. The 
tradition of membership by participation and no forced registration ensures that he and 
others in the same situation can participate - be members - without having their participation 
                                            
4 based on overview counts during field visit 
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revealed to their employer. In continuation of this, it is told with barely concealed amusement 
that a former president of BLM turned out to be a policeman. He died, and the members 
didn’t know before they turned up at his funeral and saw that it was an official burial. “There 
are three kinds of intelligence5: Those we know and they know we know; those we know off 
but they do not know we know and surely, there are some that we don’t know of” (Francis 
Sakwa Makande, field notes). The relationship with the state, not least the police, in the BLM 
is complex and often troubled (Omanga and Rasmussen, 2012). This will be explored and 
elaborated in the analysis. However, in the deliberating practice they seek to be inclusive:  
“When people are new in Bunge, they want to throw out policemen. But when you are more 
experienced you know they are people too. Maybe they come to patrol. But they hear the 
debate and they end up participating. If we want change, we also have to change the police”  
(Kenneth Kirimi, recording) 
The open structure also entails that there are many motivations for coming to BLM. At the 
same time there is a fundamental consensus of the public deliberation as the essence of 
BLM, and there are many positions on where the BLM should form beyond Jeevanjee 
(Omanga & Rasmussen, 2012). This multiplicity gives occasion to an on-going debate within 
the BLM, about the form and level of pursuit of political influence beyond the daily debates 
in the park. Some members are concerned that the more members commit themselves to 
activist commitments, like protest and demonstrations, the more it will provoke increased 
police interference and infiltration of the practice in Jeevanjee Garden. Such views are 
countered by the members who are passionate about spreading the BLM concept. This 
group identifies as activists and they perceive the forum as the basis and part of a social 
movement (Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012). This report takes its point of departure in this 
perception of the BLM and the practice of the group, which perceives the BLM as a part and 
parcel of a struggle for social justice and a real democracy by organizing beyond the physical 
space of the BLM. This is the group which I identified in chapter two as the core group of 
BLM. 
                                            
5 Intelligence is a vernacular reference to government agent/civil police which typically are suspected 
of seeking to infiltrate the movement to gain information about the political strategies and plans 
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3.3 Local Congresses and a National Movement 
Recently the movement has initiated grassroots assemblies in peripheral and marginalized 
estates (neighborhoods); informal settlements and villages to expand and diversify their 
reach. A central part of this is the creation of the Bunge la Wamama (BLW), which translates 
to the women’s parliament. The initiator Ruth Mumbi explains:  
“We started Bunge la Wamama, because we saw that there were no women at the BLM. 
Women cannot go to town (because they have obligations to care for the family). And also 
in Africa women don’t speak when men are there. So we need our own space” 
(Ruth Mumbi, BLM activist & BLW initiator, recording) 
BLW represents the feminist women in the BLM and organized grassroots assemblies in the 
informal settlements in the periphery of Nairobi. The core conveners organized a nationwide 
campaign during the referenda under the banner ‘Warembo ni yes’ (young women vote yes) 
and have active groups in both an advocacy and an implementing group. I will go into depth 
with the evolution of BLW and other local assembly BLM structures in the periphery of 
Nairobi in chapter six. 
Generally, the BLM gatherings are more active during times of important political events for 
example election and referenda, some of the forums invite the candidates to come campaign 
at the forums.6  In the wake of the post-election violence of 2007 BLM intensified the 
expansive activities, as part of the BLM multi-ethnic agenda and as a more long-term 
preventive campaign. The public debates were reportedly at a low when the post-election 
violence was at the highest, as people were reluctant to go to the city and participate in 
larger public gatherings (Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012). Around the time of the constitutional 
referendum in 2010 there were active People's parliaments in 11 major towns of Kenya and 
more than 7 rural areas. Hence the movement is (or at least was at the time) represented in 
all provinces, except for the North Eastern. The movement platforms all work as semi-
autonomous entities with their own leadership. It is the sum of all the platforms, which in 
                                            
6 Cf. conversations and interviews in Mombasa, Kaptempwa and Nakuru 
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conglomeration they refer to as 'the mega parliament' (BLM, 2010: 10f; Rasmussen & 
Omanga, 2012). I will elaborate on these historical events in the following chapter.  
BLM is an open platform, which is stressed by the BLM. The movement encourages anyone 
to initiate a platform, and have published guidelines on how to start and build a peoples’ 
parliament (BLM, 2010: 8). It has been a priority of the leadership from 2011-137 to expand 
the movement and activists are seeking to integrate this in the implementation of the new 
constitution and its focus on devolution, by making a structure of local assemblies keeping 
the local government structures accountable. Presently members, through NGO’s, have 
received international funding for pilot projects in two states (cf. Francis Sakwa, Kenneth 
Kirimi, David Otieno, BLM activists and the latter is the incumbent President of BLM, field 
notes and recordings). Each platform is organized differently but based on similar principles 
(Kimari & Rasmussen 20108 & observations). 
At the same time, it is presented that the utilization of new and social media, has ‘dipped 
deep into the middle class’ (BLM, 2010: 9; Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012). For the movement 
to grow strong enough, it is necessary also to reach the middle-class, Gacheke explains. 
For example they started collaborating with the price winning photographer and activists 
Boniface Mwangi and are working to set up after work meetings with residential associations 
in the upper middle-class areas.  
“It is hard to mobilize the middle-class, because they think it is not about them. They have 
to understand that it is also in their interest. If there is no poverty, there is also more safety 
for them”  
(Shamit Patel, Activist and Business man, recording).  
The challenge of mobilizing the middle-class is hence understood simultaneously as a 
matter of accessibility, network and of sensitization.  
3.4 The Mission 
The movement aims to form a space for Kenyans to discuss “real life, real time” challenges 
and investigate the relation of these issues with the national and global politics and political 
                                            
7 Elections are  held on august 17th hence after the end of the field trip 
8 This is also exemplified in the BLM structures in Mombasa & Nakuru 
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accountability. This could for instance be the content of the new constitution from 2010, but 
it could also be on a more practical level such as day-care for children. Most often it springs 
from the daily life of the participant or from the parliamentary agendas or mainstream media. 
The larger issues often translate into mundane issues eminent to the members’ everyday 
life, just as the larger political reflections of the everyday life issues emerge through the 
deliberations. The intention is to mobilize the ordinary people to develop and consolidate 
their power to push for change in favor of the majority of Kenyans. On that basis their stated 
mission is: Organizing citizenry, Setting the Agenda and Transforming lives (BLM 2010: 10). 
Hence the aim of the deliberation in BLM is two-pronged; it forms per se a civic education 
through which people become aware of their own rights and political room for action. At the 
same time, it forms a community of action - a communal off set for mobilizing political action 
(Kimari & Rasmussen, 2010). It is these arenas for learning in social action that will be 
explored further in the following.  
BLM articulates the need for a People’s Parliament arising from a democratic deficit in the 
Kenyan society. They argue that the ‘political class’, understood as the economic and 
political elite, has attained power across the Kenyan society and neglects to represent and 
rule in favor of the ‘common mwananchi’ - the ordinary people. Thus this is an initiative to 
present a ‘real’ parliament of the people; a space for organizing, educating and mobilizing 
the people; to rebuild a civil society that can constitute a counter-power to the political elite 
and hence balance the democratic system (BLM, 2010). In this struggle the BLM approach 
is at one time to stay critical of the dominating political institutions which they criticize for 
lacking accountability towards the ‘ordinary people’ and at the same time seek to influence 
and negotiate with these institutions. BLM tracks the weak civil society to both the individual 
and the organizational level, an analytical distinction of levels which are of course 
intertwined. However, on an individual level they identify a high degree of electorate 
illiteracy, tribalism, poverty and a lack of grassroots organization and hence peoples’ power. 
Moreover, they state that the mainstream civil society has turned itself into ‘Euro-dollar’ 
chaser industry focused on championing Western interests at all costs (BLM 2010: 9). In 
other words, that it has turned the mechanism of accountability towards the donors at the 
cost of their constituency. The depolarization and professionalization of the civil society can 
be recognized in the political history of Kenya, which I will turn to in the following chapter. 
Thus, BLM position themselves in opposition to the state and the political system at large, 
including the mainstream NGO’s. But as it will appear later in this report they also seek to 
collaborate with these organizations strategically, when it is in line with their principles. The 
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platform is politically independent, but the members can be, and several are, active in 
parliamentary politics and in these activities displaying their loyalty to BLM (Kimari & 
Rasmussen, 2010). As I argue that the BLM agency spring from and are embedded in a 
local culture the communication- and transportation technologies available in the ‘globalized 
era’ as described by Marshall McLuhan and later Anthony Giddens (Kaspersen, 2005: 573) 
this culture is inherently co-developed in a hybrid with global tendencies. The Arab spring, 
the Occupy movement and the Brazilian and Turkish uprisings in 2013 were among the 
inspirations from the media, which took presence in the BLM deliberations. Moreover, 
participating individuals with experiences from the British Student movement, different Pan-
African networks and the World Social Forums9. As the inspirations of the BLM practice 
manifold, it is essential that the fundament is ‘the everyday practice’ and the deliberation, 
through which the practice per se is constantly negotiated.  
  
                                            
9Several activists from the BLM have participated in the WSF 2007 and 2011 facilitated by the 
Fahamu network for social justice 
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4 Historical Background 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a historical context for the case study of Bunge la 
Mwananchi (BLM). I will show that BLM must be seen in the lights of a tradition for critical 
public deliberation, which dates back to pre-colonial Kenya and additionally must be seen 
as inscribed into a history of struggle for space for political participation and accountability 
governance that can be benchmarked at least back to the anti-colonial struggles in the 
1950’s. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a thorough historical review of the 
development of the state system and the popular struggle for democracy in Kenya since 
independence, rather the intension is to provide an overview with selected highlights of 
political transition and associations, which are deemed to have impact on the emergence of 
BLM today.  
 
”Then, we knew we had a dictator as president and found ways to survive in a hostile, 
autocratic environment; today, our so-called liberators have proved to be no better than 
wolves in sheep’s clothing. Our sense of betrayal today is far greater than it was even three 
years ago, because everyone we thought was on our side was actually only looking out for 
himself and herself.”  
(Warah, 2004: 14) 
As described by Kenyan writer and journalist Rasna Warah in her essay on contemporary 
Kenya, the yearning for political accountability and democratic governance is still vivid in her 
country. Democracy can be understood as a state’s ability to conduct free and fair elections 
(Ajulu, 2000). However, if civil society organizations and popular movements are omitted 
from participating in politics during and between elections, there is an important component 
of democracy missing. If citizens are not able to come together to deliberate in the public 
sphere, they are kept from evolving, developing opinions and participating in politics. 
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Furthermore, they are unable to keep their elected leaders accountable. Therefore, it is 
considered problematic, as many scholars on African politics conclude, that an African public 
sphere for civil society is overshadowed by a gargantuan, yet feeble state, and in this way 
stifles opportunities for participation and organizational life (Kalra, 2012: 7).  
Kenya has a vibrant tradition for public deliberation and political association (Nasong’o, 
2007: 25), a tradition that can be dated back to pre-colonial Kenya (Kimari & Rasmussen, 
2010; Haugerud, 1995). Although social movement ideally should be visible during all times, 
the demarcations, wishes and ways of functioning in social movements stand out and 
become accentuated during time of political transition. This is also the case in Kenya, where 
political opponents for long time have had to fight for a voice against colonial and oppressive 
governments. As reflected in the quote by Warah, Nyinguro and Otenyo (2007: 6) presents 
the sense of frustration and betrayal of popular causes by the power elites as a common 
denominator for the popular attempt for transition in Kenya. This echoes in the BLM, where 
the government’s failures of representation are repeatedly mentioned as an incessant 
motivational factor for participation.   
The Mau Mau has been called the first great liberation movement of the modern period 
(Mazrui, 1972 in Nyangena, 2003: 14). The Mau Mau movement was probably the most 
well-known force of resistance to the colonial rule in Kenya. The movement had a central 
committee in Nairobi and a militant wing organized in cells in the forests around Mount 
Kenya and Aberdares Mountains. The power relation and intensity of communication 
between the two are debated, but the movement is known to have had a decentralized 
leadership and be organized by quasi-autonomous cell structure (Buijtenhuis, 1982; Fox, 
2012). A number of organizations and associations formed to aid this struggle, calling for 
political transformation towards a governance system that was democratic, inclusive, just 
and fair and hence a fundamental change from the colonial governance system (Wayande, 
2009: 11-12). In 1963 Kenya gained independence from the British colonial rule. Jomo 
Kenyatta, who had struggled alongside the Mau Mau for fair distribution of land and power 
and against the colonial rulers and their loyalist home guards 10 , was inaugurated as 
President under the banner “Harambee, or let us work together, in building a free nation” 
                                            
10The last two decades of their rule, the colonial rulers had transferred land, jobs and political opportunities to 
nurture a loyalist elite of Kenyans and hence ensured that this strata had strong impetus for protecting their 
own interests and hence the system after independence. Moreover, the regime declared a State of Emergency 
in response to the Mau Mau rebellion in 1952 which among other things entailed prohibiting nationwide parties, 
which weakened the opposition post-independence and also nurtured ethno-regional identities and inter-group 
competition which is still determining for Kenyan politics today (Branch and Cheeseman, 2010: 6-7; 12-13). 
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(Nyangena, 2003: 5). A quarter of a million people gathered in Uhuru Gardens in December 
1963 to celebrate independence (Branch and Cheeseman, 2010: 7). However, the end of 
colonialism did not equal freedom or democracy per se, as Warah reminded us in the 
opening quote above. After his inauguration, President Kenyatta neglected to do away with 
the centralized administrative structures and governance traditions of the colonial rule, as is 
the case in many post-colonies (Musila, 2010: 293; Hassan, 2013). The Kenyan 
independence constitution was drafted to ensure democracy, human rights, devolution of 
power and checks and balances, however, according to Cottrell and Ghai (2007) it only took 
around five years of amendments to overrule the original intentions (p. 3). The victory of 
Kenyatta and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was in Anderson’s terms ‘a victory 
for nation over region, and for nation over tribe’ (p. 257) because it also marked the 
dismantling of the Majimbo (regionalist) system of government. The Majimbo system had 
been fronted by the opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), in pre-
independence negotiations between 1960 and 1963 as means for a new constitution to 
protect smaller ethno-regional communities from the dominance of larger ethno-regional 
communities. KADU members counted loyalists to the British rule and had been opposed to 
the Mau Mau struggle. Majimboism were by critics deemed tribalists and were accused of 
serving broader goals to undermine a potential radicalization of a Kenyan nationalism with 
luminaries counting Kenyatta (Anderson, 2005: 547-9). Hence, independence became the 
end of the devolved Majimbo system and instead Kenyatta adopted a centralized system of 
governance, inherited from the colonial administrative apparatus, complete with legal and 
statutory instruments and prerogatives, which allowed the President to have firm control 
over the associational space across the country (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2007: 29). A ‘policy 
of order’ was re-instituted - a mode of governance that many still perceive as the core of the 
Kenyan government policy today. With reference to upholding stability and order, the 
government restricts the rights of the citizens, in particular at the cost of political rights such 
as freedom of speech and association, hence obstructing popular political deliberation and 
participation. Post-independence government inherited an expanded centralized provincial 
administration, the security forces were strengthened during the counter-insurgency 
campaign against the Mau Mau movement. The Mau Mau movement was sought 
marginalized by the Kenyatta rule and the imagery of the rebellion has been sought 
appropriated by Kenyan people in later struggles. An example hereof is the Mungiki 
movement that draws on the memory of the Mau Mau in their violent and criminalized 
struggle for land reforms (Branch and Cheeseman, 2010: 13). There are many and 
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conflicting perceptions of the Mau Mau movement in the Kenyan society (Kennedy, 1992; 
Fox, 2012). In recent years, however, the Mau Mau fighters have been recognized as heroes 
by the state11. This perception echoes among core activists in the BLM. Likewise, many of 
the core activists in BLM sympathize with the struggle of the Mau Mau’s and in continuation 
of that with the cause of struggle of the Mungiki movements, even though they disagree with 
the violent means. However, the militarization of the Mungiki is by some perceived as a 
result of state provocation. 
The Kenyatta rule assumed legitimacy from the defeat of the colonial rule and, moreover, 
enjoyed the favor of the public. Evaluating the Kenyatta government against the former 
colonial rule and its social service neglects (Branch and Cheeseman, 2010: 18). Yet, 
Kenyatta’s government restrained the associational and organizational space. In the 
immediate post-independence era, the middle-level social organizations continued to be 
based in the major cities. Although the associational terrain grew more heterogeneous 
during the Kenyatta regime, their influence on government was attenuated; independent civil 
society organizations (CSOs) were enveloped and their room for maneuverability strongly 
restrained (Nasong’o, 2007: 30). As a result, the CSOs resorted to one of two strategies: 
they either retracted in an attempt to limit the state influence or assumed tight patron-client 
relations with the state. Few institutional mechanisms were available to mediate between 
communities and state, which made personal networks - often in forms of ethnic boss-men 
(social brokers) - essential. This only enhanced the ethnically based divides as well as a 
political culture of clientelism (Branch & Cheeseman, 2010:14). Trade unions were muzzled 
and co-opted, for example by the state approving the leadership, and social movements 
were pulverized and threats to the regime or its dominant elite manifested in individuals led 
to assassinations or detainment (Nasong’o, 2007: 30-31). This only left the universities, staff 
and students, and the churches active in ‘formalized’ civil society (Nasong’o, 2007: 31). 
Thus, during the years of political oppression, ‘political’ activism was mainly carried out 
though NGOs with a more humanitarian than explicitly political causes (Cottrell & Ghai, 
2007: 4). The Kenyatta rule is often glorified in the memory, but, as it would appear from the 
above, it also implicated authoritarian repression, assassination and corruption. When 
summing up this chapter, I will return to the implications of this ‘politics of continuation’ of 
colonial practice of governance, which was first manifested in the Kenyatta rule.  
                                            
11 With the new constitution 2010 ‘Kenyatta Day’ was rebranded to Mashujaa Day to celebrate all 
those involved in the liberation struggle (Fox, 2012). 
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4.1 Consolidating an Authoritarian One-Party State 
Stepping into power in 1978, after the late President Jomo Kenyatta, President Daniel Arap 
Moi inherited a centralized system of governance. Consolidating his power, Moi 
marginalized those that had campaigned against him succeeding Kenyatta (Chemengich, 
2009: 25). Lacking a capital base Moi ‘Looted from the original looters’ as a public servant 
is cited in Nasong’o (2007: 32). Like the rule of Kenyatta, Moi’s ran his regime with significant 
references to ethnicity, and he continuously played different ethnic groups off against each 
other in order for himself to remain in power. Where the Kikuyu12 had been favored under 
Kenyatta, Moi chose to redistribute power and resources away from the Kikuyus, as they 
had been supporting Kenyatta (Kivuva, 2011: 5). In this way, he ensured an opposition from 
the beginning of his rule. To hedge himself from this opposition, he reconfigured economic, 
legal and political institution, for example by legally consolidating Kenya as a de jure single-
party rule. He augmented the centralization of the administration and banned a number of 
radical civic groups, a tendency which was enhanced after the failed attempt of a coup d’état 
in 1982 (Nasong’o, 2007: 32; Chemengich, 2009: 25). These developments and an 
intensified crack down on left-wing intellectuals and radical elements forced the social 
movements to go underground and simultaneously catalyzed a radicalization of the 
movement. This paved the way for revolutionary movements like MwaKenya and December 
twelve Movement (Kivuva, 2011: 6; Nasong’o, 2007: 33-34). MwaKenya, a group of political 
dissidents, was founded in 1979 primarily by academics, teachers and journalists. They 
operated primarily underground due to the repressive regime (Kagwanja, 2003: 31). The 
movement was allegedly run from abroad, a token of the political situation at the time. 
Nasong’o (2007) concludes that their failure to train political and military cadres, and their 
weakened leadership, being exiled in Europe and hence debarred from the social reality in 
Kenya, became a hindrance for the MwaKenya movement. Many activists ended up tortured 
and jailed in 1985-86 (p.  34). The movement have been described as lacking clear 
leadership (Widner, 1992: 177; Nasong’o, 2007: 34), the theme of un-organized or 
horizontally organized leadership will be elaborated in the analysis in chapter 5. Activists 
from MwaKenya would later become part of starting and institutionalizing BLM in Jeevanjee 
Gardens. Another movement that emerged in this time, and form basis for the BLM today, 
                                            
12 There are over 70 distinct ethnic groups in Kenya, ranging in size from about seven million Kikuyu 
to about 500 El Molo. The five largest are Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba and Kalenjin which in sum 
account for 70% (East African Living Enclypedia, African Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kethnic.htm 140420) 
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is Release Political Prisoners. It emerged as a campaign to free those who had been taken 
prisoners, illegally, and continuously document and work against politically motivated 
violence and extra-judicial killings (RPP, 2012; recording). With this crackdown on the 
movements, Kenya de facto turned into an authoritarian police state, where only sections of 
church and Law Society of Kenya articulated alternative views on poor governance, 
corruption and human rights violations (Nasong’o, 2007: 34). At the time, political 
mobilization against the state often ended up in battles between police and citizens and 
(Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012). 
The mid-1980’s also market a shift in the policy of the international donors. The statist 
developmentalism proved failure with an economic implosion and the elaboration of parallel 
forms of social organization emerging on the eve of independence across Africa (Chazan, 
1994: 263 in Nasong’o, 2007: 34). Interlinked with this process was the wake of the change 
in policy of the international donors, increasingly redirecting their funds at the CSO’s and a 
focus on ‘democracy and governance’, which was treated as ‘technical and management 
issues’ rather than politics and elevating ‘development’ as the principle task of the state. 
This process at once depoliticized ‘development’ and the CSO agency, and placed the 
CSOs in the center of the political economy, inherent in a strategy of mediating the state-
society relation and ‘empowering’ both (Haugerud 1995: 21; Nasong’o, 2007: 35). This 
development is perceived by many BLM activists as the dawn of a de-politicization of the 
civil society and the increasing accountability towards international donors, rather than local 
constituencies. They feel that this development is strong to this day and opposition to this 
development is at the core of their political mission.   
While the Kenyan state had eliminated or eroded the independence of most formal civil 
society organizations by the late 1980s, a rich informal associational life continued to thrive. 
Subordinate and oppositional groups carved out their own democratic space! In bars, 
football matches, religious organizations, courts, matatu taxis, markets, and funerals 
(Atieno-Odhiambo 1987: 200-201 in Haugerud, 1995: 17). These places formed popular 
spaces that can serve as the crucibles for the development of the habit of democracy (Keller, 
1991: 52 in Haugerud, 1995: 17). This tradition of critical subaltern public deliberation formed 
as an urban hybrid of pre-colonial traditions from across the country and continent 
(Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012). I will elaborate on this tradition separately in a following 
section. Yet, it is important to note the contours of strands of civic organization, the CSOs 
and these subaltern informal associations respectively, as this distinction are key to the 
understanding and identity of the BLM.  
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4.2 The Second Liberation Struggle 
The multi-party movement is by some conceived as the Kenyan people’s second struggle 
for liberation. In 1991 the pro-democracy movement succeeded in pushing Moi to repeal the 
Section 2 (A) of the Constitution and thus reestablish judicial multi-party democracy. The 
Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) was emblematic for the victorious reformist 
movement. Hence, the FORD model succeeded in restoring the state’s backlash in the 
democratic development of the country. However, it has been said, that the movement failed 
in developing and organizing a strong enough ideology as well as reforming the vertical 
organization to a horizontal unifying body (Nsang’o, 2007: 38; 48-49; Hassan, 2013: 3-6). 
Additionally, the FORD movement has been criticized for suffering from a political 
personalization, which has been identified as a general tendency of weakening leadership 
in African politics (Ibid.). The FORD foundation has, especially under the leadership of 
current Chief Justice Willie Mutunga, close ties with the BLM, through economic and 
intellectual support and political solidarity (Gacheke Gachihi; PatitaTingoi, recordings). In 
spite of the reinstitution of the multi-party system, the political practice did not live up to the 
structure. Branch and Cheeseman (2010: 15) describes this process as characterized by 
the looting of the state budget - corruption and cronyism, electoral manipulations and 
subcontracting of private militia to undertake political violence, a process that referred to as 
the in-formalization of the political process. Both under Kenyatta and Moi, the Kenyan 
institutions decayed, as they were used as instruments to support the incumbent 
government (Adar, 2000: 3). Yet, the Moi rule succeeded in gaining the international 
society’s acceptance, both the 1992 and 1997 elections. This resulted in what Ihonvbere 
(1996) termed a ‘democratic dictatorship’ (cited in Murunga & Nasong’o, 2007: 8), a rule 
which is able to parade democratic credentials without reforming the repressive regimes. 
This further meant that most Kenyans became alienated from the state (Ibid; Kivuva, 2011: 
6). Still, the trajectory events of the 1990s opened a space for democratic discourse, which 
served as a continuation of a decolonizing discourse and politics of participation under the 
umbrella of quest for democracy (Kalra, 2013: 44). 
The struggle for democracy in Kenya has been long and persistent. The 2002 presidential 
election became an emblem of success for advocates of multi-party democracy, 
constitutionalism and good governance (Kivuva, 2011: 6). It was a landmark, heralding 
expectations that a new and democratic political era was dawning in Kenya. After four 
decades and for the first time in the history of the country, the Kenya African National Union 
  
Page 28 of 76 
(KANU13) was defeated. For the first time, a president retired from office and moreover, the 
victorious party was a united opposition, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC). It 
was led by Mwai Kibaki, promising to usher a new political agenda of dialogue consensus 
and power sharing (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2007: 9). Kenyans did become freer under Mwai 
Kibaki’s presidency; restrictions on the media and the political organizations were loosened, 
but the progress was limited and the ‘part-democracy and part authoritarian hybrid’ created 
under Moi assumed a degree of permanence under Kibaki (Branch and Cheeseman, 2010: 
16). The progress was limited so that any reforms that would have diluted executive power 
were deferred (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2007; Branch and Cheeseman, 2010: 17). As the 
power sharing between the politicians bettered with the 2007 elections, the political 
accountability towards the population still left much room for improvement. As Kibaki 
consolidated his regime, the promises became a mirage. Less than two years after the 
election, Kibaki abandoned the memorandum of understanding of the coalition behind the 
government and with that the power sharing, reforms of the ‘over centralization' and the 
administration quickly acquired an ethno-regional bias, much like the previous regimes 
(Murunga & Nasong’o, 2007: 9; Brown, 2004: 334; Branch and Cheeseman, 2010:16). A 
number of luminaries from the civil society were brought into Kibaki’s government. 
Expectations were raised that these individuals would use their democratic credentials to 
nurture and promote a new mode of politics for the overall betterment of governance in the 
country (Murunga, 2006: 3-5). Many BLM activists describe the lack of satisfactory changes 
with big disappointment. . It is also linked to the weakened civil society, due to the many civil 
society leaders who left to join the government and that the civic critique was less vocal to 
the Kibaki regime, due to the prior ties. Sakwa expressed it as follows:   
“We knew them as ourselves, so we forgot that government need civil society to hold them 
accountable. So many activists went into government or became professionals14 so now we 
have to train new radicals”  
(Francis Sakwa, field notes).  
According to their own testimonies, many civil society activists acted as if because they had 
contributed to bringing this government into power, they should stay loyal to the regime. 
Moreover, several vocal and recognized civil society leaders joined the government and 
                                            
13 The political party of Kenyatta and Moi 
14 The BLM activists generally refer to NGO employees as professionals. They work with them, but 
also often refers to ‘professionals’ as contrasts to the ‘activists’, because they (a) only practice “9-5” 
and (b) “are depoliticized" (field notes) 
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government related official seats, hence the Kibaki regime absorbed the radical oppositional 
voices by inviting them into to the machinery ‘robbing civil society of leadership’ (Wayande, 
2009: 16-17). Additionally Kibaki re-limited the media’s room for maneuverability in 2007 
(Ibid.). These tendencies supplemented the aforementioned de-politicization of CSOs and 
weakened the civic critique and demand for accountability of the system. 
4.3 Politics of Continuity 
Since the anti-colonial struggle, the key issue has been distribution of land. Twelve per cent 
of the Kenyan land is home for 75 per cent of the population, agriculture on this area 
accounts for 75 per cent of the country’s employment and 90 per cent of its exports. Still, 80 
per cent of this land remains on the hands of 20 per cent of the population (Branch & 
Cheeseman, 2010: 4). Successive regimes have neglected to deal with the unjust 
distribution of resources and in addition there has been little bettering of the conditions for 
the unemployment ridden informal settlements in the periphery of the cities of Kenya. Close 
ties have been imposed on the unions with the state, to facilitate state control over CSOs. 
To varying degrees refusing to reform the state, in order to protect their monopoly on political 
power, Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki have undermined their own legitimacy. Ultimately all three 
were resorted to the use of coercion in response to popular dissatisfaction (Branch and 
Cheeseman, 2010: 8). Based on this review of the political history of Kenya, Kenyan 
governance can be characterized by continuities. Branch, Cheeseman and Gardner (2010: 
17) identifies three types of continuities from the colonial to the post-colonial rule: The first 
covers what Nasong’o termed ‘ideology of statism’. It refers to a centralized and 
overdeveloped system of governance (Nasong’o, 2007: 37). Chabal and Davoz 
characterizes the post-colonial state as being ‘both strong and powerless’; overdeveloped 
in size and underdeveloped in functional terms, still its ability to shape the space for political 
participation has been and is all too real (Branch and Cheeseman, 2010: 11) as evident in 
the above. The second is the ‘ideology of order’, which underpinned the centralization of 
power - order (security) trump liberty, equality and development, even though this has also 
been a consistent, dominating agenda in post-independence Kenya. The ideology of order 
has served to justify political and social failure of government and neglect or suppress claims 
for political and economic redistribution from both opposition and constituency as well as to 
oppress and undermine the legitimacy of challenges to the ruling class (Hassan, 2013: 18). 
Finally, the third politics of continuation is the ethnic political machines and ‘big-men’ rulers 
(Nasong’o, 2007: 30). The colonial structures laid the foundation for strong patron-client 
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relations of political competition and deep communal divides, through their ‘divide and rule’ 
tactics of governance (Branch & Cheeseman, 2010:14). This has resulted in a 
personalization of politics in Kenya (Nsang’o, 2007: 38) and cultivated the politicization of 
the omnipresent ethnic identities. This continuation in governance can be given reason in 
the transition from colonial rule to independence. The new Kenyan political elite had served 
apprenticeships in the colonial provincial administration and the colonial rulers had 
transferred land and wealth to the loyalist elite and hence ensured that they had strong 
impetus for protecting their own interests and hence the system (Branch & Cheeseman, 
2010: 12-13). Ethnic identities are ubiquitous in Kenyan society not least in politics. 
However, as Brach and Cheeseman nuanced comments, with the permanent process of 
interweaving between class, ethnicity and governance has occurred in much of post-colonial 
Africa, and heavily in the Kenyan society, it is difficult to identify the exact moral foundation 
of social and political claims (Branch & Cheeseman, 2010: 2). Recognizing the ethnically 
tied identities reigning in the Kenyan society, Branch and Cheeseman also dispute ethnicity 
as the dominating political identity and argue that the Kenyans are as much rooted in class 
politics and the capture of the state, as is the competition between ethnic groups. They 
argue that during the 50 years of independence the opposition supporters desire to get their 
share have been expressed collectively with fellow Kenyans across ethnicity, class, religion; 
by youth, women, and others considering themselves marginalized (Branch & Cheeseman, 
2010: 2-3). Both reflections are central to the struggle of the BLM activists. However, as 
basis for the analysis of this thesis I primarily draw on the dominating analyses among the 
activists and hence the point of departure for the BLM agency: that the politicization of 
ethnicities by the political elites succeeds in redirecting the ordinary people from the primary 
and class based oppression. This causes a need for “reframing the tribal conflict to a class 
struggle”, as Francis Sakwa and Patita Tingoi, (recordings) both declares and as stated 
below this is the reason d’être of the Unga Revolution campaign. 
4.4 Constitutional Reform Movement 
“No Reform No Election” was the banner of the movement for constitutional change, which 
was spearheaded by the Catholic Church in the run up to the 1992 elections. In the following 
years the protests increased and radicalized and so did the regime, leading to deaths on 
both sides in public clashes (Nsang’o, 2007: 38-41). However, the referendum was 
postponed into the Kibaki rule era, and by the time it reached referendum in 2005 it was 
perceived to be so heavily amended by the government in power, that it was rejected by the 
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Kenyans (Nsang’o, 2007: 47). It would be 2010 before Kenya got her new constitution. Many 
highlighted the essentials of an inclusive process leading up to the referendum and the 
strong devolving nature of the constitution. The core activists in BLM were highly engaged 
in this process, notably “Warembo Ni Yes” (young women vote yes) led by the Ruth Mumbi 
succeeded in organizing and mobilizing nationally (Ruth Mumbi; Victoria Atieno, recordings). 
The inclusive process leading up to the referenda including citizens’ sensitization across 
country and not least in the wake of the post-election violence of 2007, has been conceived 
as a popular acceptance of people-centered constitution-making process (Adar, 2000: 126). 
Rendering new hope for Kenya to enter a new political era, many look to the Constitution as 
a way to constrain executive power and prevent further destabilizing violence. However, this 
bright picture is scattered analysis of the process of the referenda on the constitution in 2010 
does not point to a clean break from Kenya’s authoritarian governance past (Hassan, 2013: 
2). Two characteristics of the constitution is particularly central for the BLM activists, this is 
on one hand the devolution of power and on the other the inclusion of the basic human 
rights, both are used actively in their organizing as I will elaborate further in the analysis. 
The new constitution gives civil society and civic action a new space, but the task of keeping 
the implementation process on track demands for a vivid and active civic watch dog, looking 
at the Kenyan governance legacy. 
The elections in 2013 brought the Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto to power (with 50.07 
per cent of the votes)15, though the result was contested by the opposition lead by Raila 
Odinga, who was the favorite between the two major candidates among most of the BLM 
members. The data for this thesis was collected in the months after the elections in the 
spring 2013. Therefore, scholarly analyses of these elections are not yet available. However, 
the snapshot provided in this thesis must be seen in the light of the recent history of the 
Uhuru/Ruto victors, with a pending trial in the International Criminal Court of Justice, for the 
atrocities in the aftermath of the 200716 elections. The perceptions in interviews and the 
                                            
15 This result caused for much indignation in the opposition, which insist on the result being rigged. 
It however said, that to avoid repetition of the crisis in 2007, Odinga stepped back and accepted the 
verdict “accept and move on”. The victory was confirmed by the an elect committee lead by Chief 
Justice Willie Mutunga, this process give cause to a returning discuss of the autonomy of CJ Willie 
Mutunga among the activists, who is seen as an ally and a silent member of the movement. The 
further discuss of this election process is beyond the scope of this paper. 
16 In the post-election violence 2007-8 more than 1000 Kenyans lost their lives and 600.000 were 
displaced. The presidential victorious team Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto are accused of being 
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mainstream media was that a broad range of effort to prevent a recurrence of a conflict or 
violence was to a large degree successful, yet the elections were by many deemed the most 
tribal to date. 
4.5 Civic Critique and Political Participation 
According to Nasong’o (2007) the dual legacy of the post-colonial rule covers on one side 
the statism, developed and perfected by colonial rule and on the other side, the freedom 
movement that challenged this same system. If the first legacy bequeathed the post-colonial 
elite, the centrality of state and governance, the latter provided civil society with the notion 
that states can be challenged. Nasong’o (2007) argues that civil society was reinvented, 
‘empowered’ and charged by the international donor society, with the onus of 
‘deconstructing’ the authoritarian state. And that in this process the state was depoliticized 
resulting in the present victory of the statism (p. 37). This has resulted in a perceived schism 
between the civil society understood as the NGOs on the one side and the ‘ordinary people’ 
on the other. This critique widely dismisses development agents and market agitators as 
being elitist and pushing foreign agendas dictated by the donors (Chemengich, 2009: 28). 
This perception is strong among the BLM activists, as presented in chapter three. The BLM 
activists shared in interviews that they often are invited by NGOs to ‘provide the numbers’ 
but feel frustrated about not being heard or sought for council on the strategic or even 
planning level. Moreover, when they are invited for extensive collaboration, the BLM is 
expected to pose as a program rather than a partner (Gacheke Gachihi, field notes).  
As illustrated above, the experience of the space for civic activism and political participation 
has been limited in recent Kenyan history. Formalized CSOs have been enveloped or 
dispersed. Another political continuity, on the civic side, is the tradition of public deliberation 
- where the space for organizational activity diminished, the amorphous movement of 
subaltern critical deliberation remained. Oppressed groups often develop their own means 
of interaction to criticize the dominant power, termed by Scott (1990) as ‘infra-politics.’ Infra-
politics refers to the fundamental basis for more institutionalized activity in times of tyranny 
and which offers ‘defense in depth of the powerless’ (Kalra, 2012: 8). Nairobi has traditionally 
                                            
criminally responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator for the crimes against humanity prosecuted at 
the International Court of Justice for the atrocities in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. As the 
pending cases have ostracize the Kenyan leadership in the international society, many analysis 
points out that they might succeed assuming support though these prosecutions into an anti-imperial, 
anti-western discourse and conviction in the Kenyan population as well as the African Union. 
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been a magnet for political protest and critical awareness, ever since colonization (Kalra, 
2012: 41pp). Rasmussen and Omanga (2012) trace a tradition of critical public deliberation 
to the pre-colonial era. They describe how the rural traditions were brought into the cities 
with the rapid urbanization of the 1950s and onwards. The emerging urban centers became 
bases for cultural syncretism, labor and political protests as the rural migrants came to the 
cities with overlays of strong rural tribal tradition. They brought with them established ways 
of doing things, loyalty and obligation patterns (Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012). As these 
practices of public deliberation previously domiciled in the rural areas, they now found their 
way into the urban sphere and incorporated prevailing social and political realities of the 
urban life. Consequently, these traditions of gatherings formed templates for new forms of 
deliberative action in the migrant ethnic enclaves within Kenyan urban centers (Rasmussen 
& Omanga, 2012). The pre-colonial Barazas was one of many different but similar practices 
from different tribes, showing similar patterns of deliberative action in communities. Such 
gatherings existed in virtually all other pre-colonial communities in the region which 
Rasmussen and Omanga describe as the Kamukunji17 culture (Rasmussen & Omanga, 
2012). The composition and nature of these gatherings varied, where some were convened 
by family heads, others were for the full community; some were particularly gendered spaces 
and some characterized by gerontocracy; some would function as communal forums for 
decision-making where other primarily served to reinforce the authority of the leaders 
(Armstrong, 1979: 62; Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012; Nyangena, 2003).  
Based on the tradition of public deliberation the Kongo speaking people in Congo, Angola 
and Zaire, the Pan-African scholar Wamba-dia-wamba (1985) presents the ‘Palaver’ as an 
ancestral practice of African Popular democracy and propose it as off set for such study. 
’Palaver’ can be understood ‘as an organizational form of a generalized organic community 
criticism and self-criticism’. It gives all members of the community an opportunity to ‘release 
their heart’ regarding matters pertaining community life and hence developing an individual 
and collective knowledge (Wamba-dia-wamba, 1985: 3). All cards are laid on the table by 
all community members in an open debate, which is organized ‘or rather taking shape’ on 
various issues in which everyone, regardless of age or sex, is encouraged to participate 
(Ibid.: 5). It is a platform for the community to deliberate on pertinent issues and find 
constructive solutions, reaching consensus and keeping the community closely linked. In 
                                            
17 Kamukunji is a Swahili word that loosely translates to ‘a gathering’ or a ‘gathering place’.  
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addition, the importance of the traditional values in guiding the development of modern 
Africa is emphasized (Ogunyemi, 1995: 98; Wamba-dia-wamba, 1985: 9). It is hence both 
a form of governance and a form of popular education. It is a space for the chief to learn 
about the ideas among the people and how they view the rulers, in addition for the chief to 
lay out the difficulties of his role (Ibid., 1985: 12). Palaver is also understood as a social 
movement. It is a forum for both resolving conflicts, which emerge or exist in a community 
and pose risks of destroying a community must be ‘resolved with appropriate methods’. This 
can both be conflicts within the community and struggles against misuse of power by 
dominating elites; the Palaver is in that case a semi-organized and mostly spontaneous form 
of mass protest against dominants in the community. Palavers can therefore be a place for 
major conflicts to be resolved and not just be re-channeled elsewhere and the Palaver can 
hence only be resolved after the challenges, which catalyzed the emergence of the Palaver, 
are positively resolved (Ibid., 1985: 4). Hence, when Wamba-dia-wamba perceives the 
Palaver as a social movement, he describes a process of community deliberation on 
pertinent community matters or oppressive orders of the community, through which 
solutions are identified and executed, until ‘positively resolved’. The Palaver is a kind of 
collective community leadership or governance practice, as well as an inherent struggle for 
this truly open space (Wamba-dia-wamba, 1985: 4; Depelchin, 2005 chp. 8). A struggle for 
such a radically different system, through a radically different practice has been described 
as ‘prefigurative politics’. I will return to this concept in the following chapter, as I see this as 
essential to the BLM practice. Wamba-dia-wamba has been criticized for glorifying the past 
(Depelchin, 2005 chp. 8). I will not dwell further on the historical accuracy of this concept, 
but utilize it as a presented ideal for an African originated democracy and an idea that 
resonates in the ideals of practice in the BLM. 
In her examination of the Kenyan political culture, Haugerud (1995) shows how the Baraza 
as a pre-colonial tradition of an inclusive community assembly was co-opted by the colonial 
rule. What was still on the surface a participatory institution became primarily a forum for the 
colonizers to interact with the colonized (Rasmussen & Omanga, 2012; Haugerud, 1995: 
73). This reinvented use of Baraza was another continuation during the Kenyatta rule. 
Haugerud (1995) observes that the Baraza in the post-colonial period in Kenya gained 
extensive use as a quasi-compulsory public meeting addressed by politicians, civil servants 
and prominent individuals. It developed into a central meeting ground between ordinary 
people and state officials, and one of the few occasions for the public display of social 
hierarchies and the cohesion and exclusiveness and factional changes in the relevant 
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political elite, hence it informs the citizens on how to interpret and manipulate political 
symbols. ’A successful Baraza’s keeps dissent off stage’ but dissident voices from the public 
and political rivals are sometimes aired spontaneously during these meetings (Haugerud, 
1995: 3). However, it is ultimately an avenue for the state elite to ‘create and control the 
emergence of a national culture’ and ‘capture the consent of the citizens’ (Haugerud, 1995: 
2-4). This reflects well the impression of the Present day Barazas observed during the field 
trip and the descriptions from the BLM activists18. Hence the ’street parliaments’, including 
BLM, organized by citizens themselves can be seen as in linage with the pre-colonial 
tradition of Baraza, but in opposition to the present, state controlled Baraza as it is practiced 
in colonial and post-colonial and present Kenya. As argued by Rasmussen and Omanga, 
(2012), the Kamukunji culture of subaltern public deliberation manifested in the present day 
political street assemblies in Kenya, the Bunge la Mwananchi in Jeevanjee Gardens, as a 
movement and initiative from below seems at a superficial level as a response to the more 
state engineered Baraza which may also be seen as a state attempt to control the public 
space in general. 
  
                                            
18 Mumbi clarifies the public meetings for me: the Harambee are fundraisings, the Baraza’s are public 
meetings /community meetings hosted by officials and the BLM are community meetings hosted by 
the people (Mumbi and Victoria, field notes June 30). 
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5 An Approach to Social Transformation 
The aim of this chapter is to explore at the practice of public deliberation in Bunge la 
Mwananchi (BLM), as an approach to radical social transformation. This is done in the light 
of a tradition of public deliberation and popular organization, as described in the previous 
chapter, but also as an agency in redefining and renegotiating a relevant radical democratic 
practice. Thus, I will explore the BLM practice as a form of popular education that through a 
liberating praxis of reflection and action facilitates the development of critical awareness and 
sense of ability to take action among the participating citizens. Moreover, I will look at how 
this praxis can be seen as strategies for radical social transformation. Thus, to open this 
chapter I will briefly re-introduce the theoretical framework which will be drawn on in the 
analysis before continuing into the actual analysis.  
5.1 Conceptualizing Radical Social Transformation 
In a pamphlet from 2010, the BLM formulates the following vision: 
A Kenya where citizens enjoy unfettered sovereignty to organize so as to free themselves 
from all forms of oppression and domination; are aware of socio-economic and political 
rights and responsibilities, demand accountability, and have accessible opportunities and 
resources to realize their full potential  
(The vision of the BLM, 2010: 10) 
This vision illustrates the BLM’s inscription in a continuous struggle for democracy and social 
justice in Kenya. As described in the previous chapter, Kenya enjoys a constitutional 
democracy that was reinforced with the quite progressive new Constitution in 2010. BLM’s 
critique of the Kenyan democracy is both on the reluctant implementation hereof, but 
moreover targeting the whole model of liberal democracy. Patita Tingoi formulates it:  
“When we talk about democracy, the first question that pops into mind is whose democracy? 
The kind of democracy we see today preached across Africa is elections ones every five 
years … it does not work in Africa. We must have citizens participating on the smallest 
possible level. It is about citizens being able to set agenda from below”  
(Patita Tingio, recording) 
In the quote Patita criticizes liberal democracy, as inherited from the British former colonial 
system of governance, which arguably has proven to fail many places in Africa, giving way 
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to less democratic patterns of leadership (Nyangena, 2003: 11; Aké, 1993: 239). Patita 
represents a Pan-African critique of liberal democracy for its Western and bourgeois origin, 
contending that this form of political organization fulfills the need to accommodate 
dominating classes and the exploitation of the ordinary people and have through history 
been a system of oppression of indigenous groups, slaves, and colony populations (Wamba-
dia-wamba, 1985: 1). As it is a request for a radicalized participatory democracy, it is also a 
call for a locally rooted and relevant democracy.  
"A unique African democracy is not something that will emerge from a rational blueprint: it 
will emerge from practical experience and improvisation in the course of a hard struggle. 
The process towards democracy must be shaped by the singular reality, that those whose 
democratic participation is at issue, are the ordinary people of Africa"  
(Aké, 1993: 244) 
Aké argues that an African democracy must be developed from practice, in the struggle for 
influence on own life and by the people, that are affected. He argues that a genuine and 
sustainable democracy in Africa should be rooted in African traditions. The social base must 
be the ordinary people and thus such new structures might clash with powerful sponsors of 
liberal democracy, namely the African elite, the Western nations and international donors. 
According to Aké (1993), in order for African democracy to be relevant and sustainable, it 
must be radically different from liberal democracy and link the ‘political democracy’ with the 
‘economic democracy’ and well-being of the people. Based on the African tradition, it might 
be a democracy based on participation linked to communality (Aké, 1993). Hence, Aké 
seconds Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba (1985: 1-2) when he in his article ‘Experiences of 
Democracy in Africa’ establishes that a truly open ‘people’s democracy’ cannot be invited 
by the elite it can only be won through struggles by the masses from the lower strata of 
society. Experiences from people-centered movements must be the starting point for 
development of people’s capacity for popular democracy such as the Palaver (Wamba-dia-
wamba, 1985: 2). This conception of democracy, as a process rooted in the local tradition 
but constructed ‘real time’ and practice resonates in the BLM. This notion of taking point of 
departure in the local tradition and develop it through the participation of the ordinary people 
will be the lenses through which the BLM is analyzed in the following chapters.  
Thomas Nail (2010) introduces a theoretical framework for analysis of radical social 
transformation, in the form of three constructive strategies. Echoing Aké and Wamba-dia-
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wamba, he argues that to innovate radical political theory and practice that is to develop 
radically different forms of political organization: one must study the structure or political 
order particular to actual radical organizations (not just possible ones) and what 
distinguishes them from authoritarian ones (Nail, 2010: 8). To this end, he identifies three 
claimed transferrable strategies, which are meant as analytical tools to identify and clarify 
the development of new radical politics. Thereby, Nail seeks to direct the analytical focus 
towards the creation of constructive counter power. Where Aké maps the necessity of this 
process in Africa, Nail proposes a framework of strategies for how to identify this knowledge. 
The three strategies are interlinked but separated for analytical purposes. The three 
strategies identified by Nail are: 
1) A multi-centered strategy for political diagnosis,  
2) A prefigurative strategy of political transformation and  
3) A participatory strategy for organizing institutions. 
The first is a multi-centered strategy for political diagnosis. “BLM is a struggle against 
oppression, all forms of oppression.” (Cidi Otieno, recording). The quote of the BLM 
incumbent President and core activist in BLM reflects the essence of this strategy, which 
entails that no specific form of inequality or oppression, e.g. based on class, ethnicity, 
gender etcetera, should be or can be seen as the most central and important political 
struggle (Richard Day quoted in Nail, 2010: 11). Rather, all these political struggles against 
inequality and injustice should be seen as intersecting. Rather than being cause for 
groundlessness and lack of infinite responsibility, it should be seen as a wealth of struggles, 
which can constitute ‘a positive multiplication of axes of struggle’. Hence, the multi-centered 
strategy means joining this multitude of political struggles in radical movements (Nail 2010: 
11). The second strategy is a prefigurative strategy of political transformation. It is a strategy 
to achieve radical political transformation by practicing the world one wants to see. It is 
based on a logic of ‘reversed causality’; by creating a radically different present, one can 
make basis for a consecutive and radically different future. The idea is to ‘bring the 
imperceptible to perception’ by changing the dominant conditions for visibility (Nail, 2010: 
17). When the BLM practice and nurture an inclusive, horizontal political practice in the 
everyday of the street parliaments it is a prefigurative practice, because they visualize a 
radically different form of political conversation than that they observe dominating. This can 
be seen as an escape, but moreover, it is the creation of a political ‘machine of struggle’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 142; Deleuze, 1987: 136; Guattari, 2008: 210 in Nail 2010: 17). 
Finally, the third is a strategy for organizing institutions. This is neither a strategy to improve 
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the present institutions, nor to build counter institutions, which are solely aiming to 
undermine the present form of representation in the hope of something new and better to 
appear. Rather these institutions are created and sustained through an expressive process 
of constant and immanent transformation by the praxis and the people that are affected – a 
participatory transformation of constant coadaptation. It is not a normatively driven process, 
but political problems themselves transform and are transformed reciprocally by those who 
participate in them and hence affect them, without knowing ends in advance (Nail 2010: 20). 
Hence, the road is built by walking as Hollaway popularly formulated it in his studies of the 
Zapatistas (2002). The three strategies are interlinked but separated for analytical purposes. 
In the following, I will seek to apply them to BLM Jeevanjee as a foundation for my reading 
of their agency as a praxis of transformative change. 
To explore the transformative process for the participants in this and the next chapter, I draw 
on the Brazilian educator and activists Paulo Freire and the perspective of critical 
transformative learning in a broader sense. At the core of Freire’s Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed is methodology of conscientization, which refers to the oppressed’s development 
of critical conscience and sense of agency through an emancipatory praxis; the dialectic 
process between collective action and reflection through critical dialogue based the social 
reality of the oppressed. “It is only when the oppressed find the oppressor out and become 
involved in the organized struggle for their liberation that they begin to believe in themselves” 
(Freire, 1993: 47). Where Paulo Freire takes point of departure in his practice as adult 
educator, Griffen Foley’s field of study is learning in social movements and community 
organizing. Foley looks at the learning processes going on ‘in the struggle’, summed up in 
his seminal work, ‘Learning in Social Action’. As these processes are often tacit and implicit, 
the role of the educator becomes to facilitate and explicate the emancipatory learning 
processes inherent in the political organization. This perspective will be guiding the following 
analysis. To sum up this approach, I will quote of Paulo Freire: “[H]uman activity consists of 
action and reflection: it is praxis; it is transformation of the world” (1993: 107). Hence, the 
process of conscientization through dialogue-based praxis is perceived as a basis for social 
transformative change.  
5.2 The Praxis in Jeevanjee Gardens  
The aim of this section is to examine the practice in BLM Jeevanjee as a praxis of social 
transformation. This section will primarily focus on the dialogue and reflection, whereas the 
following chapter will focus more on mobilization and action.  
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In the corner of Jeevanjee Garden, in the central business district of Nairobi not far from 
Nairobi University, the BLM gathers. Below the nicely trimmed bougainvillea, a group of men 
are standing shoulder to shoulder. In the center of the group shaded by the trees, a man is 
seated on a stub between four stone benches were people are seated even closer. The man 
on the stub is the chair and the discussion is heated:  
“Lesbianism and gayism is something that came with the British. It is not African”…“You are 
wrong. Research shows that same-sex relationships were in pre-colonial Africa. The Kikuyu 
community traditionally…” the man standing at the border of the pergola’s green roof is 
insistently seeking to continue his lecture, as he is interrupted from across the crowd. “Which 
research?!” … “let us see that research” … “Bring it then, let us know you speak the truth” , 
“order”, “order”  Input appears from different sides of the circle as he continues “I know that 
there are clubs in Nairobi, where people are openly gay”… “Are you gay?! How would you 
know?”…”order!” order” …“chair”…”don’t get personal. One at a time…”, the man sitting on 
the stub in the center of the group raises his arm to underpin his statement, before he allows 
the next speaker. An experienced activist steps into the middle of the circle: ”comrades, 
don’t get personal. He can argue his case….” As the activists remind the crowd of the rules 
for the conversation, another well-known face takes over “Personally I believe that African 
tradition is family values - a family builds on a man and a woman. But sexuality is private. 
And in spite of your sexuality, you are human and so you have a right not to be harassed. It 
is constitutional.”… “Chair, chair” someone seeks to contribute.  
The debate continues: Is the Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Transgender, Inter-sexual, Queer 
(LGBTIQ) community protected by the constitution as human rights holders? How can the 
constitution be implemented? Should they even discuss this or is the pertinent issue 
poverty? Can struggles be placed in hierarchies? I chose this example19 because LGBTIQ 
is probably one of the most contested subjects in BLM Jeevanjee20 deliberations. This is a 
token of how the BLM reflects the Kenyan society. Patita Tingoi concludes: “The fact that 
they are debating is a big step. Three years ago, you would not have heard it mentioned. It 
was taboo” (recording). The example illustrates how the BLM, while reflecting the conflict 
                                            
19 This example is inspired by field notes from a BLM discussion on the topic, but not accurate word 
by word. The form is inspired by Rasmussen & Omanga (2012). 
20 Another as contested subject is ethnicity and politicization hereof. The choice is also based on 
notes from observed debated that primarily happened in English, as stated in chapter 2 the lion’s 
share of the deliberations in BLM are done in the creel dialect Sheng, which I do not speak 
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lines in the society, becomes a place to “discuss anything without fighting violently” 
(Njuguma Kahonu, recording). A study from 2007 shows that 96 per cent of the Kenyan 
population feels that society should reject homosexuality (Kohut, Wike & Horowitz, 2007: 
35). The man who was arguing for gay rights in the example above and a few others standing 
with him constituted a very small minority on an issue that for many is perceived as a 
foundation matter of their communal identity as a nation and a continent. Several LGBTIQ 
reports of discrimination, harassment, political persecution, violence and murder (Blessol, 
field notes; George; Joyce; Patita Tingoi recording) and moreover, homosexual acts are 
illegal and punishable with up till 14 years. This is inherently reflected in the political 
landscape. In 2010 Raila Odinga as prime minister condemned homosexuality, although he 
later retracted it. On the other hand prominent progressive figures as Chief Justice Willie 
Mutunga stated in 2011 that the rights of homosexuals equal human rights (Chang & Dazols, 
2012). The essence is that all subjects can be discussed and are repeatedly and peacefully 
discussed in the BLM, and that this practice of open deliberation is the pivot of the 
community - like the ‘war of ideas’ in the Palaver; a place to resolve conflicts that threats 
dividing the community as described in chapter four. Lave and wenger describes this as 
negotiating meaning, which constitutes a dialectical process of participation and reification, 
where the participant learn the norms and values of the community but simultaneously co-
construct them. Looking to Nail’s strategies for radical social change, this practice of 
peaceful dialogue in the ‘radically different’ from the majority political culture in Kenya, hence 
this practice can be understood as prefigurative.  
5.3 An Inclusive Community 
As introduced in chapter three, BLM is open form of membership and equal access to 
participate in the deliberations is a fundamental value in the BLM:  
“In Bunge everyone can talk, be it man, be it woman, young, old, Kenyan, non-Kenyan 
anybody is entitled to an opinion. Nobody will attack you because of where you come from 
- which tribe, country or class.”  
(Njuguma Kahonu, elected speaker in BLM, field notes 130619/recording).  
In the quote Njuguma highlights the equal right to participate in the deliberations in the BLM. 
In this way, the BLM community is pursuing a diffusion of power and dissolution of 
hierarchies: They challenge a hierarchical structure in the surrounding society, for example 
based on gerontocracy, patriarchy, class and ethnicity. This horizontal organization can be 
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perceived as radically different from the surrounding society and hence as prefigurative 
politics. These practices are upheld by a sophisticated set of ‘standards of the house’, the 
incumbent elected speaker explains:  
“The standards of the house: When somebody speaks, you must stay quiet. If you have a 
point of order, information or contribution, you raise your hand… A point of information is 
two minutes, it can't be a contribution - not divert from the main issue…”  
(Njuguma, speaker in BLM, field notes 130619) 
As it appears from the quote, the practices are quite detailed in format, and includes 
principles such as ‘no hate speech' and ‘not personalizing arguments’, as shown in the 
example opening the chapter. Such regulations aim to regulate and counter techniques of 
master suppression and other micro-fascist21 practices and hence facilitate an actual equal 
access to participation, which is an ideal for the BLM, which again point to a prefigurative 
political practice of transformational change. For example, as described in chapter three 
introducing the BLM, the majority of participants in BLM are men and female members 
mentions the patriarchal culture as prevailing structure in the Kenyan society and a 
hindrance for political participation. As a part of the Kenyan society, this culture is reflected 
in the BLM. In recognition of this, there have been initiatives to counter the 
underrepresentation of women a special seat for women has been set up under the 
pergola22. This serves as an example of a hierarchical structure, which is prevailing in the 
majority society and which exist in the BLM, but is contested and challenged through the 
practice. This happens by seeking to nurture a space, where all subjects can be raised and 
discussed, as described in the previous section. But in the BLM they also seek to practice 
this, by creating an inclusive space to participate. In spite of the initiatives in the park, there 
are very few women in the everyday practice. The deliberations in Jeevanjee, both male and 
female respondent have varying takes on the role of and space for women in the BLM - how 
it has been and how it should be handled in the BLM as well as in society. But there is a 
                                            
21 Micro-fascism refers to when a movement or radical social formations reproduces oppressive 
power relations on a particular area, meanwhile struggling against another. This could for example 
be fighting class oppression on a societal level meanwhile marginalizing an internally marginalized 
group (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 205 in Nail 2010: 15).  
22 Njuguma explains how he, as a part of his campaign for becoming speaker introduced a seat 
reserved for women in the space of the BLM debate  
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general consensus, that there is a lower level of participation of women as well as that 
gender based discrimination is addressed when it happens and many highlights that women 
are especially encouraged to input to the discussions23. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to fully explore a gender dimension, but as will be elaborated in a later section on the Bunge 
la Wamama (women’s parliament), there are other structural reasons that can restrain 
women’s participation in BLM, for example that it is most often women who are responsible 
for the home and thus cannot travel to town (Edra Mbatha; Ruth Mumbi, recording). Ruth 
Mumbi highlights this in her reasoning for initiating Bunge La Wamama (BLW, women’s 
parliament): ”We started because there were no women and because women do not speak 
in men’s presence in Kenya” (Ruth Mumbi, recording) as well as their lack of access, 
however, her partner in organizing BLW Victoria supplements “it is only a mindset, it can 
change” (Vicky Atieno, recording). As the gender balance is skewed in BLM Jeevanjee, the 
ethno-regional divides seems to be overcome. As also observed by Kalra (2012) and 
Rasmussen and Omanga (2012) factions in the BLM seem to be based on political 
convictions and strategy for the BLM and to be both overlapping and fluent. However, in a 
society as the Kenyan overcoming the ethnic divisions as a main determinant is worth 
noticing and also unique for BLM Jeevanjee compared to other the street parliament in for 
example in Nakuru and Mombasa (cf. Kalra, 2012 & observations and conversations). 
5.4 Facilitated Dialogue  
The responsibility of upholding the rules and norms of the assembly is delegated to a chair 
that facilitates the meetings. This role rotates among the activists. People volunteer and 
when one leaves the floor, another enters. It is typically people who want to train their 
political capacities or experienced activists who pose as chair. If the debate is not chaired 
to the satisfaction of the crowd, and the chair is for example perceived to take sides or 
misinterpret the norms and rules, the chair will often be removed and a meta discussion on 
process and conduct will take place before the topical discussion can continue. The level of 
rigidity of the formalities is often leveled with how controversial or ‘heated’ the discussion is. 
                                            
23 During interviews, I have generally asked into women’s participation, their stance on women quota 
and on feminism, plus their understanding of the term. The positions range from queer feminists to 
conservative traditionalists in both genders. However, general for the women were that they felt very 
strongly about their position, which was not characteristic for the male respondents.  
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Experienced members can be called to the floor either to chair or for a point of information. 
The role of the chair strongly reflects the role of the ‘Nzozi’ of the Palaver, described by 
Wamba-dia-wamba. Nzozi literally translates into speaker (chair)24. 
"The Nzozi can and do make use of rhetoric but they are not above all rhetoricians … A 
good Nzozi is one who knows how to listen attentively and tirelessly and picks up the 
essence of each word, look, or gesture and facilitates the Palaver in progresses line with 
ideology of the community. In a sense the good Nzozi is like a shepherd who makes sure 
that the Palaver moves on toward a resolution. The role of the Nzozi is not to openly take 
sides with a thesis of a member of the community but to assure that the criticism and self-
criticism are carried out according to the ancestral procedure of mass democracy”  
(Wamba-dia-wamba, 1985: 17 in Depelchin, 2005: 179)  
The Nzozi is facilitating the meeting in accordance with the communal norms and values, 
which seems to be the ideal of the BLM. I observed that people typically removes 
themselves or are removed from the chair because they want to contribute with a political 
contribution or because they are perceived to have moved into political contributions by the 
community. The rotation of chairing the meeting thereby becomes a horizontal practice, 
which diffuse the power and facilitates the ideal practice of the chair, referring to the 
description of the Nzozi, but also develops the role of the Nzozi from being personalized to 
being a practice or a role that members actively step in and out of. The shared ‘ideology’ of 
the forum is hence bound to the code of conduct and to the pivotal character of the open 
and critical dialogue in and among ‘the common people’. This is a process where members 
learn from each other. It is also a war of ideas in which values are constantly negotiated 
(Wamba-dia-wamba, 1985). The role of the Nzozi or the chair then becomes a facilitator of 
a collective learning process, which is both a process of learning from each other and 
negotiating and constructing new knowledge (Apte, 2009; Wenger, 2004). 
5.5 Leaders and Leadership 
As described in chapter three BLM in Jeevanjee Gardens has an elected speaker, just as 
there is an elected president. The president typically acts as spokesperson and contact 
person when BLM collaborates with other organizations and initiatives, and the speaker 
                                            
24 Speaker and chair seem to be used interchangeably in the BLM, so I will take the liberty to do so 
here 
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chairs the meeting when he is present. The tradition of electing people for seats stems from 
a mock election in 2002, because the regime had banned anyone from using the title. BLM 
hence organized a mock election with competitive candidates and transparent ballot boxes 
and as described in chapter three this was when they started referring to themselves as the 
Parliament of the People, implicitly, as opposed to the formal Parliament (Oyayo Owimba, 
recording). Taking on such a name could be understood as an act of radical prefigurative 
politics by visualizing the mismatch between practice and preaching in the ‘democratic 
dictatorship’ (Cf. section four). The practice of representative mandates can be perceived 
as contrasting to the horizontal practice described above. How the BLM is and should 
actually be organized is constantly debated and as mentioned different factions are based 
on these discussions. This is also reflected in the numerous active online accounts posting 
on new and social media in the name of BLM Jeevanjee. This means that the ‘voice of BLM’ 
is not necessarily unified, however, this is highlighted as strength by the activists, because 
it reflects that “no one can own bunge” (Julius Okoth, field notes). This reflect the constantly 
transforming nature of the BLM, drawing on Nails (2010) vocabulary there are several un-
prioritized political tendencies at once, but no essential political ideology (p. 12) and this 
very nature of organization is the fundamental ideology of the BLM; the deliberative action 
in Jeevanjee and the amorphous organizational nature of this gathering is agreed to be the 
core of BLM.  
5.6 A Political Education 
When I asked why people come to the BLM, the concurrent answer is ’information’. 
Participating in the BLM becomes a political education. This education entails instrumental 
skills and knowledge obtained through the participation in BLM. “You learn skills and tools 
for organizing, speaking in public or how to handle the police” (Eilud Mwangi, field notes). 
Through participating in BLM people gain knowledge on specific subjects or professions, 
inspired and relevant to the participants’ everyday life and/or springing from the political 
agenda. Examples from my observations are public transport in Nairobi, tribalism and tribal 
characteristics; the process of implementing constitutional, the national budget negotiations 
or strategies for non-violent struggle. Training in public speaking, debating and political 
organization are equally highlighted by many BLM members, also as motivation for running 
for seats in such as speaker and president. This part of the ‘education’ is also highlighted 
by Wamba-dia-wamba. He describes Palaver as ‘above all a process of very intense 
generalized mass education’ and besides that ‘being an ideological and philosophical 
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struggle organized and carried out communitarian’ (Wamba-dia-wamba, 1985: 31 in 
Depelchin, 2005: 178). Drawing on Freire (1993) and Foley (1999), these processes can be 
seen as integrated. This is, as described above, what Freire sums up as conscientization: 
to develop a critical awareness through dialogical practice. Through a still more active 
participation in a collective process of interpretations and actions through the participants, a 
common ground and ‘meaning’ is negotiated and reached. Hence meaning is not a 
permanent nor a given attribute, but a constant development process that unfolds in the 
everyday practices (Wenger, 1998: 54f). As such the before mentioned ‘ideological and 
philosophical struggle’ is part and parcel of the ‘mass education’ as ideology and practice 
and ideology are ‘produced, challenged, reproduced and transformed in both individual 
consciousness and social practices through active participation‘ (Foley, 1999: 14). Critical 
to Freire’s (1993) concept of conscientization is that it must be based on praxis, which 
consists of both reflection and action (p. 150). Eilud has been a member of BLM for 12 years. 
Originally he passed by the location in a lunch break, he saw them discussing and was 
intrigued. He explains:  
“I thought I had learned everything in school, but participating in Bunge la Mwananchi has 
taught me that I didn’t know everything. So many different people come here to share their 
different knowledge. It is very educating. (…) Bunge la Mwananchi creates new ideas on 
how to move the country forward, they are true patriots” 
(Eilud Mwangi, field notes) 
Eilud describes the BLM members as patriots, because they develop solutions for the 
country based on the communal sum of experience and knowledge of the ordinary people. 
They train each other in political analysis by conducting this communally in an open 
dialogue. The topic of discussion is as diverse as the crowd. The topics mostly spring from 
current societal issues or directly from the everyday experience of the participants. When 
an issue is brought up in BLM, it is interrogated from all sides and solutions are developed, 
which resonances with the process of Palaver described by Wamba-dia-wamba as unfolded 
in the previous chapter. Eilud states that through participating, he learned things that he did 
not know he wanted to learn. So this process of conscientization is core for the Palaver ideal 
and BLM as a transformative agency. The participant does not have to come with the 
motivation of becoming politicized, but can develop an interest facilitated by the experiences 
activists – the Nzozi or revolutionary leader in the vocabulary of Wamba-dia-wamba and 
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Freire respectively. Thus Freire argues that revolutionary leadership must be a pedagogical 
act (Freire, 1993: 150). 
 “We came and we found that we were sharpened. The people from the struggle of multi-
partyism in 1992, they came here and now they turned into teachers, people from 
MwaKenya. The current CJ25 were there and members of the underground movement. 
Those members were there. They told us how they did it. Slowly by slowly we were being 
sharpened. We came as community workers, but we ended up as movement builders and 
mobilizers. For me, it is a college. If you sit down and you listen to the people that are there, 
you will perceive the world differently” 
(Edra Mbatha, recording) 
This process, which Edra describes, in which ‘ordinary people’ develop critical awareness 
enabling them to question their own social reality and mechanisms of oppression within, this 
is what Paulo Freire termed conscientization . According to Freire, this is the basis for 
transformational change. The process of conscientization is a process of identifying 
generative themes that have powerful emotional impact on the daily lives of the ‘ordinary 
people’ to enable them to break the culture of silence and their self-perception as 
subordinate. This dynamic of critical consciousness also includes taking action against the 
oppressive elements in one's life that are illuminated by that understanding (Freire, 1993; 
1986). I will return to the latter in the following chapter on mobilization. Hence, through the 
dialogue in BLM people gain knowledge on the discussed topics, people of different 
professions and different experiences share their area of expertise. In a transformational 
perspective, referring to Freire, the most important part of this process is, however, that the 
partakers become able to apply this knowledge, by understanding it as a part of their own 
social reality, in a possession of oppressed, but also with the ability to act. “No one can, 
however, unveil the world for another. Although one Subject may initiate the unveiling on 
behalf of others, the others must also become Subjects of this act. The adherence of the 
people is made possible by unveiling of the world and of themselves, in authentic praxis.” 
(Freire, 1993: 150) This process is ensured and facilitated by the core activists in a 
pedagogical practice of revolutionary leadership.  
                                            
25 Popular reference to Chief Justice Willie Mutunga 
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In the terminology of Wamba-dia-Wamba, the role of the Nzozi is to lead the Palaver to 
progress in accordance with the ideology. Therefore, the ideal of the Palaver, as a 
description of the ideal of the BLM practice, should not be limited to the location under the 
pergola in Jeevanjee Gardens, but a practice that is passed on to other communities by the 
members of the BLM. Personally I perceive this role of facilitating the continuation of the 
practice not only as the role of the ‘speaker’ or ‘chair’ facilitating the meeting, but as a 
directed and situated facilitator of critical emancipatory learning process, which springs from 
a specific space, but is not bound by it. An understanding inherent in the ideal of the Nzozi, 
but I feel it needs to be explicated because this is a fluent role not bound to a specific setting 
and hence elaborates this role. The activist becomes an educator - a facilitator of 
transformative learning (Apte, 2009; Freire, 1993: 150).  
In spite of the immediate hindrance of transparency made up to the fear of infiltration by 
state agency, the open structure by the public location is fundamental for the ideology of the 
BLM, and the infiltration by government agency is a calculated part of that. Rather than 
seeking to hide from them, they seek to co-opt them: 
“When people first come to the park and they learn that there is intelligence here, they want 
to throw them out. But after participating for some time, they learn. We have to include 
people if we want to change, also the people that we disagree with”  
(Kenneth Kirimi, field notes) 
Kirimi’s argument of incorporating the oppressor, here the state agents, are also central to 
Paulo Freire’s (1993) argument. The aim of the dialogue in the BLM is to be inclusive in their 
practice. Kirimi describes how they want to include those that work for ‘the system’ to be 
able to influence them. As this full inclusiveness adhere to the dialogical practice, the actual 
planning of political action is mostly done outside the park, typically in the surrounding café’s 
where the gathering is more selective.   
BLM activists, and members in general, often refer to mastering both instrumental and 
analytical skills for organizing as to ‘having graduated from Jeevanjee’, this means that you 
are ready to start your own thing. This can be a business, NGO, activism or something 
different. It does not matter, as long as it is in line with the BLM values (Francis Sakwa 
Makande, field notes). As described earlier in this thesis, the focus here is on the ‘political 
wing’, those that perceive the BLM as a social movement. There are different ways of 
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‘becoming an activist’ in the BLM movement. Being an activist, or a human rights defender, 
is being someone who has internalized the BLM values and practice – has graduated - and 
hence identify and act on multiple injustices. Kamotho explains:  
“You can hear it from the way they argue, if it is based on the human rights. Then you can 
hear if they are new or if they are activists”  
(Patrick Kamotho, recording). 
The quote is a token of how the activists, through their participation in the BLM deliberation, 
frame the discussions in accordance with the ideology of BLM and thereby ensure that the 
mundane are connected to a structural level and analyzed in a rights and class based 
perspective. The structural level topics are contextualized to the everyday life (the social 
reality) of the people present, and the analysis develops on a human rights based, class 
basis. When asking to how members became activists, many describe it as a lifestyle and 
something they feel was always there. Back casting, it is common for the activists to have 
stories of always being the one that spoke up for the weaker or being spokespersons in the 
communities or groups they were part of. For some as school representatives, volunteering 
in CBO’s or being active in the unions, for others it is organizing self-run security groups for 
their peers or fighting abuse and exploitation with the means available. Whether they have 
been moving in civil society or ‘political society’ groups depends on the class background 
(Frederiksen, 2010). However, another common denominator is that it was through 
participating in BLM that they perceived this behavior as political and that they started 
connecting these local injustices with structural injustice. Reminding us of Edra’s words: “We 
came and we found that we were sharpened (…) We came as community workers, but we 
ended up as movement builders and mobilizers (…) you will perceive the world differently” 
(Edra Mbatha, recording 130625). Many, like Edra, came to Jeevanjee because they were 
frustrated with societal situation, but did not know how to act on this frustration, and were 
introduced to the BLM by an acquaintance or saw the BLM in TV, when it was broadcasted 
at Citizens TV26. The heritage from the MwaKenya activists, which founded the Release 
                                            
26 BLM used to be broadcasted weekly on CitizenTV, but was taken off, according to Gacheke, 
because they because they were perceived to have become too critical towards the government – 
and sided with the opposition (recording). But the major mainstream media channels still often come 
to BLM to get statements on the current political issues.  
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Political Prisoners (RPP), has played a strong role in the activist wing of the BLM (Gacheke 
Gichihi, field notes). Msangi explains:  
“I was arrested in 2006-8 and falsely accused of robbery, murder and violence. That is a 
very serious crime. I found myself in Industrial27 [state prison]. A man named Mwangi gave 
me a book of rule of law. I learned that they could not keep me without evidence, so I had 
to argue my own case and the court equipped me.”  
(Msangi, recording & field notes) 
The meeting with the BLM activist became a catalyst for reform for Msangi. His encounter 
with rule of law and the experience of being able to argue his way out of a determining 
situation catalyzed a hunger for knowledge as well as a political agency. Such an experience 
of successful political agency is what Freire describes as conscientization; the RPP aided 
this process for Msangi in prison, but he himself had to become a political Subject, 
understanding the injustice and the taking of liberatory action. Released from prison he 
came to the BLM and Gacheke, an experienced activist from the same area, took him under 
his wing and in as an apprentice. Several core activists explain how they met activists ‘who 
were talking about human rights and government’ whilst in prison and then was connected 
to the BLM afterwards (E.g. Kamotho, recording; Kirimi, recording). The encounters and 
relationships developed, not only across ethnicity, but also across class is highlighted by 
several members as both a strength for societal coherence but also a necessity for 
developing people centered solutions; to develop solutions that reflect a common good’ it is 
necessary to include people from all strata of society they argue, again often contrasting to 
the national parliament. As BLM far from represent all strata of society, they arguably 
represent groups that are often marginalized and lack voice in the public discourse. Adding 
to facilitating and escalating the situated learning processes, the progressive CSOs Release 
Political Prisoners and Fahamu network for social justice28 conducted structured political 
trainings of core activists.  
                                            
27 Industrial is the vernacular reference to the local major prison located in the industrial area of 
Nairobi 
28 A Pan-African network of individuals groups and organizations, focusing on social movements 
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5.7 Sum up 
Summing up, the practice in Jeevanjee is characterized by its open structure, seeking to 
facilitate an equal access to participation and contribution. These include actively countering 
reigning hierarchies and micro-fascism. The inclusive nature of the BLM in Jeevanjee 
Gardens with the open membership facilitates a manifold contribution, which expand the 
shared understanding of life conditions for ordinary people in Kenya. It allows BLM to 
‘incorporate oppressors’ in the dialogue on solutions and moreover, create and develop 
connections to people in the government system and thereby to affect the system from 
inside. Facilitating changes in people’s approach to the world is essential to the BLM 
practice. Participating in BLM is a learning process. This educational perspective both 
covers instrumental learning such as tools and skills for organizing, leadership and public 
speaking, but it is also a transformative learning process, where people develop a critical 
awareness to their social reality and a sense of agency, to feel able to affect the society in 
which they live. Hence BLM becomes a form of popular education. 
BLM mirrors majority society, and participants are constantly re-socialized into the capitalist 
culture reigning. Hierarchies exist in the BLM, but the structure of practice in BLM is 
developed to counter these structures by diffusing power and ensure a horizontal leadership. 
The active and institutionalized countering of hierarchies, the amorphous nature and open 
membership structure are aspects of the radically different form of organizing reigning in 
BLM. With reference to Nail theoretical framework, this leads me to conclude, that the 
practice in Jeevanjee can be characterized as prefigurative in nature and moreover, in the 
non-normative and constantly re-constructed ideology, can be shows characteristic that 
points to the development of a form of participatory institution. There seem to have emerged 
two parallel structures of organizing the gathering in Jeevanjee. On one side, the amorphous 
horizontal practice reflecting the ideal of the Palaver and on the other a representative 
leadership, which entered as a creative event to mock the power holders, and are only partly 
institutionalized as a recognized leadership structure. These two systems draw on different 
forms of representations and legitimacy, which can appear as a blurred and unsettled 
relationship however it might as well be understood as an inherent part of the constant 
deliberative practice of ‘negotiation of meaning’ as this multiplicity of ‘political ideologies’ are 
part and parcel of the fundamental values of BLM. 
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6 Political Mobilizations 
Freire (1993) argues that there is a duality between reflection – through dialogue – and 
action – through political mobilization, which enables conscientización and concurrent 
radical social transformation.  This chapter draws on his ideas in order to explore different 
ways of political mobilization by the BLM activists and how these activities feed into the BLM 
strategy of social transformation, based on the analysis of the BLM approach, elaborated in 
chapter five. 
The BLM mission is to organize, educate and mobilize the ordinary people of Kenya. This 
process is led by the core activists. As presented in chapter five, Wamba-dia-wamba (1985) 
describes that the Nzozi, constitutes ‘a cadre in the popular democracy organized through 
the Palaver’ (p. 17 in Depelchin, 2005: 179), but in the case of BLM this practice goes 
beyond its immediate geographical scope, this will be a focus point of this chapter. Freire 
(1993) argues that the role of the revolutionary leadership is to facilitate a praxis of 
conscientization - a praxis combining reflection with agency, through which the ‘ordinary 
people’ develop a critical consciousness (p. 49). With the impetus of escalating the 
movement, the activists started organizing in Nairobi lives in the informal settlements in the 
periphery of the capital. Many of the people living here have neither time nor resources to 
travel to the city center to deliberate, hence to reach this groups it is necessary to organize 
where they are. The agenda of expanding the movement to the periphery of the city as well 
as to other parts of the country has intensified since 2007. This had at least two catalyzing 
factors: one was the inspiration from the Latin American movements during the World Social 
Forum in Nairobi of ‘going to the people’ (Gacheke Gachihi, recording); the other was the 
peace building after the 2007-8 post-election violence, where civil society, including BLM 
activists, were leading in promoting the subsequent  peace-building processes (Rasmussen 
& Omanga, 2012). Nail’s multi-centered analysis and Freire’s theory of conscientization 
combined show that in order for the social transformation to take hold of the whole society 
the praxis of conscientization has to take place at all levels of society. In this chapter I will 
show that the process of social transformation and democratic participation, which is central 
to the BLM has indeed spread to different parts of the Kenyan society through grassroots 
addressing everyday needs and challenges of different groups but mostly based on local 
involvement. Apart from these longer-term grassroots movements often base their work on 
local needs and seeking to work through the political structures I will also show how the BLM 
activists get involved in local protests in other parts of Kenya and act as local organizers 
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there – hence seeking to mobilize the people and create awareness in an immediate crisis 
situation. Moreover, I will show how the BLM praxis has been radicalized in the Unga 
Revolution campaign and here the revolutionary potential of social transformation 
movements, underlined by Nail, has been most vivid. However, before moving into the 
detailed analysis of how the movement manifests itself in different parts of the Kenyan 
society, I will discuss briefly the target groups of BLM mobilization as this is important to 
keep in mind when moving the analysis beyond the Jeevanjee Gardens 
When focusing on who the BLM aims mobilize Cidi’s quote mentioned above “BLM is a 
struggle against ... all forms of oppression.” (Cidi Otieno, incumbent president of BLM, 
recording) is important to keep in mind. The quote conveys the BLM baseline aim of fighting 
against all human rights violations in line with the practice of a multi-centered analysis, which 
highlights that the struggle against one form of oppression can never overshadow or even 
cause another form of oppression, as presented by Nail (2010, cf. chapter 5).  
As an example of how the BLM struggle involves different groups in society that experience 
any forms of oppression and not just the most obviously oppressed groups is the campaign 
for police reform. The campaign sprang from the BLM debate that started with police 
housing. The campaign initially focused on up-scaling police housing, but developed into 
pushing for a broader police reform on education, salaries etc. Margereth explained how the 
campaign emerged:  
“There was a time that I personally went to the Central Police Station. I wanted to get a form, 
because my uncle had lost his driving license. Now, it was very difficult. I was told that the 
person, who is issuing those forms, is in his house. Then I went to his house. I thought he 
was living alone. Imagine, they were sharing one room, three police officers. And they were 
married. The room was separated by curtains. (…) Then we were starting to push for 
reforms, from Jeevanjee Gardens. That’s when the government took over that idea and 
builds more houses. We started pushing for it 6 years ago.”  
(Margereth Amiango, recording) 
In the quote Margereth provides a very trimmed presentation of the campaign offset. I find 
this campaign particularly interesting because it is illustrative to one way the BLM interacts 
with the state and societal development. The BLM activists have a troubled relation to the 
state and it seems easier for the members to meet confrontational police than open-minded 
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bureaucrats (Rasmussen and Omanga, 2012: 17). Arrests are an inherent part of the 
activists’ lives - there are still many arbitrary arrests, but with the constitution they can sue 
the state, which many of them do though this is a long and costly process. Some have won 
(Patrick Kamotho, field notes). As a struggle from below or within the system, these cases 
can be seen as a part of contributing to the implementation of the constitution. The police 
housing campaign aimed at improving the living standards of the police in order to lessen 
the impetus of corruption and, at the same time, to improve the relationship to the authorities 
in the everyday life for the activists And adding to the implementation of reforms and better 
governance.  
In this campaign they are working with a coalition between the police authority and the 
Inspector General, to push for further police reform. There have been initiatives in the areas 
of police housing and education. The campaign has led to a change between older and 
younger officers. “A young police officer will warn seriously, and old will beat you and harass 
you.” (Kenneth Kirimi, field notes). Kirimi emphasizes that the pressure has to continue, 
there is a need for the public to participate to ensure that there are reforms in the country – 
particularly police reform, because this is part of securing that the people can struggle for 
other reforms. He connects the post-election violence, that this violent mobilization was 
possible, to historically unfulfilled appeal for land reforms (Kenneth Kirimi, field notes). As 
mentioned in chapter three, this is an example of how the BLM at times seek to both counter 
the state and engage in the constructive development of state institutions. 
A different example of BLM campaigning in solidarity is the story of Andrew: the city council 
police captured and castrated a young boy29 who came from a football match for street kids. 
His mother went and consulted the BLM who supported and advised on the reaction. They 
succeeded in mobilizing different marginalized groups and the Mayor appointed committee’s 
on the safety of these different groups (Cidi Otieno, recordings). Joyce, the mother, explains:  
“When I heard I call everybody, I call Bunge la Mwananchi, LGBTI, sex worker, hawkers, I 
told them I have a problem and what happened. They all came to the street, we were 300 
people. And in the end the Mayor of Nairobi came to talk to us… then I understood the power 
of organizing (…) that was when I knew I was an activist”  
                                            
29 http://storify.com/sautiproject/11-year-old-boy-forcefully-castrated-and-fighting 13.12.12 
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(Joyce Muthoni, recording). 
This provides as an example of two things: Joyce’s experience of mobilizing constitutes an 
example of conscientization facilitated by the BLM activists and additionally these solidarity 
actions are reflections of a multi-centered analysis of oppression. By reacting in solidarity 
with this variety of groups experiencing oppression and bringing these struggling 
communities together, the BLM activists contributed to ‘joining the struggles’ and hence 
benefitting from the multi-centered analysis in building popular power (cf. Nail, 2010).  
6.1 Territorial Organizing  
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter the social transformation stemming from the 
BLM takes place on many levels. Also in Kenya territorial organizing has proven to be one 
very powerful way of organizing, as I will show below in three different cases where territorial 
organizing has become the basis for mobilizing different groups around different topics. 
 
Muthurwa Estate (a residential area), is located in the central business district of Nairobi. In 
2009 the 3000 residents were given 3 days’ notice to vacate the land, because the state 
wanted to develop it from being a residential to a commercial area. The residents sought 
counseling in BLM Jeevanjee Gardens. The constitutional expert, Prof. Yash Ghai, who was 
overseeing the constitutional process, was frequenting the BLM at the time informing on the 
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new constitution which went to referendum 2010. He advised the residents of Muthurwa 
Estate on the Kenyan constitution:  
“The article 43 [on social and economic rights] has been cut and paste from South Africa. 
(…) In South Africa they had had a situation where the people challenged the government 
on the right to housing. So when the constitution passed in Kenya in 2010, petition 65 was 
from the residents of Muthurwa.“  
(Patrick Kamotho, recording) 
What the community leader and BLM activist Kamotho explains in the quote is that by 
consulting BLM and a resource person there, the residents of Muthurwa Estate became 
aware of new possibilities in the new constitution. They managed to collect funds and find a 
semi pro-bono lawyer and won law suit against the state, so the majority of the residents 
retained the right to their land for residence. The court case and the struggle with the 
government have served as an opportunity to strengthen the organization of the community. 
In Muthurwa Estate, the residents have organized themselves in a residence welfare 
association. Through the association, youth groups have been allocated small income 
generating activities such as running toilet buildings and small kiosks. There are small urban 
gardening initiatives and the former railway worker estate has reinvigorated a tradition of 
boxing. The boxing club is instrumental in getting youths engaging in in small crime back on 
track. Kamotho explains how his relationship with the police in Muthurwa Estate, where he 
is Chairman of the residential association, benefits from the positive relationship with the 
police. They will now help them if there has been theft in the area, they come to him because 
he knows the local youth and who to talk to. Mostly, he can get back a stolen cell phone in 
a day or two, he explains with a smile. In that way they are constantly negotiating the 
relationship with the police.  
In Muthurwa Estate the collaboration with the police has been very concrete and has since 
2009 evolved from physical clashes between citizens and authorities and citizen organize 
security, to collaborating on crime prevention as described above. This is, however, not a 
linear or single path of development, but still progressive. When the community faced 
expropriation and organized against the state, they took different initiatives. As these 
initiatives emerged as a response to an urgent threat, the events contributed catalyzing to 
the organizing of the community. First, residents bought whistles and gave them to women, 
children and others that were located around the community. Whenever a police vehicle 
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entered the estate they should start whistling, the people close to would start whistling and 
people from across the community would join them to alert the community to gather and 
‘hold the estate’. “When we bought the whistles and whenever they used to come, even if it 
is the police, the entire Nairobi used to stand still” (Patrick Kamotho, recording). Another 
step was to ease the mass communication in the community they painted blackboards in 
strategic places across the 72 block which constitutes the Muthurwa Estate. So the Sunday 
residents’ assemblies were announced at the blackboards. At the same time the board were 
used for announcing matanga (wakes in memory of the departed)30, community policy, and 
cleanup in the area “we write on the blackboard instead of going to shout, whenever we are 
doing community cleanup… or organizing a boxing match tournament” (Patrick Kamotho, 
recording). The blackboards eased the dissemination of communication for practical 
information from the organizers to the broader community, as well as between residents. 
Hence the active use of the board to ‘social messages’ enabled a communication of more 
‘political messages’ as well; it eased the communication and facilitated the organization of 
the community. The motivation for the community to engage in this political struggle was 
their immediate fear of being expropriated. However, the struggle prompted a politicization 
of the community. A token hereof is that when Kamotho, the BLM activist and community 
leader in Muthurwa, moved into the estate, many residents had perceived him as a criminal 
and tried to throw him out, however after he  assumed a central role in the struggle for the 
land the community supports him ardently. He straightens his back when explaining that:  
“In my community it is last year I was charged again with another charge of threatening. It 
is a very bad charge… But my community fundraised for me Kenya shilling 40000 from that 
morning I was arrested”  
(Patrick Kamotho, recording) 
Patita Tingoi (recording) seconds the narrative “I always use Kamotho as an example of real 
organizing … they cannot touch him. They arrest him and immediately 3000 people will 
stand up”. That the Muthurwa community now organizes for the release of the activist rather 
                                            
30 The matanga is wakes in the memory of those departed, which also constitute a communal fund 
raising used to buy coffins or provide transport money to transport the hearse in upcountry, fundraise 
to pay medical and mortuary bills. 
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than to get him expelled from the estate is a token of a change in perception of the residents 
and their understanding of the relationship between state and citizens.  
As the Muthurwa residents came to the BLM activists in a stage of emergency, activists from 
Huruma and Mathara initiated grassroots assemblies in their neighborhoods. In Huruma, 
Getto Green is central in this process. Get to Green is a reformed youth group based in an 
informal settlement, initiated by the activists and youth head of household Msangi. Their 
short term aim is to keep youth out of crime and prostitution. This is done both on an 
immediate level, functioning as an economic self-help group and with a longer term 
perspective, working on local, structural issues through sensitization and advocacy (field 
notes). In the informal settlement in which Get to Green is based, police harassments and 
land rights are pertinent. They inform us that just recently a young man was shot at the 
football field in the center of the area, because the police thought he was a criminal. But he 
just looked like someone who was suspected of a crime - a tragic and recurring experience 
in the area (field notes). On Saba Saba day31 2012 core activists from BLM and gathered 
local groups and organized ‘a walk against crime’. The rally was used as a means to get the 
attention of the local residents. Here they were particularly targeting youth, because they 
are the ones mostly targeted by the government (field notes). This became the off set for a 
grassroots assembly. The grassroots assembly here meets every Sunday, based on the 
same principles as in Jeevanjee Gardens, to deliberate on local issues and announce 
initiatives and activities. Here, it is primarily representatives from different community 
groups. Grassroots assemblies are typically more based on local issues, as also described 
by the women from the Bunge la Wamama (BLW, see further below). This is an observation 
that is affirmed by both Kalra (2012) and Rasmussen & Omanga (2012). However, the 
conscientization that takes place in these grassroots assemblies are an important step in 
supporting the social transformation, because conscious mobilization of the ordinary people 
must be the basis for social transformation. The grassroots assembly in Huruma has for 
instance identified land rights as a focal challenge for this community, which has led to 
collaboration with minister of land to map the ward. The reformed youth group Get to Green 
                                            
31 On July 7 1990 pro-democracy demonstrations in Nairobi and other towns in the country against 
the then ruling President Daniel arap Moi, resulted in violent clashes, hundreds of civilians were 
killed or injured while thousands more faced charges in court. The day is still marked as a milestone 
in the Kenyan democratic transition and celebrated among BLM activists (ODHIAMBO, 2011) 
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-58026/saba-saba-heroes-who-widened-democratic-space-
kenya 14.04.14) 
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is active in in this process, supported by experienced BLM activists. Hence the grassroots 
parliaments become forums for political education and offsets for action like the BLM. 
Experienced activists coach, but also use their network, connecting the local activists on 
different levels. This could be to the international human rights society in relation to 
protection regarding police threats or activists from other communities. For example Get to 
Green is initiating an alliance with university youth on partly participating in assemblies’ there 
as experienced activists or ‘Nzozi’s’ while simultaneously selling chapatti (pan bread) on 
campus – an income generating activity and a good place to have a talk with the student 
that does not actively search for the political gatherings. Moreover, the other way round, 
university youth can help them with proposal writing (Msangi, recording). In this way the 
activists are very keen on constantly increasing the network across the different strands of 
activists, strengthening the sense of community within the movement.  
As the third case in my analysis of the territorial organizing springing from the BLM I have 
chosen is the Bunge la Wamama (BLW), which translates into women's parliament. I have 
included this movement in the chapter on territorial organizing as there is an important 
territorial aspect to the work in the BLW – although the gender aspect is surely also defining 
in making the BLW stand out from the BLM and other movements. The initiators Ruth Mumbi 
and Victoria Atieno came to BLM in Jeevanjee Gardens and found that there were few 
women. The patriarchal character of the Kenyan society made it challenging for women to 
participate in the BLM. They did not feel heard. Moreover, it was not a forum to speak about 
‘women's issues’ (Ruth Mumbi, recording).  
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“It is other things that becomes relevant when you are only women (…) We have more power 
when we are alone [as women], because in Africa we have a tradition for not speaking up 
when there are men... it is only a mindset, it can change”  
(Vicky Atieno, recording) 
The gender separation with the BLW both allows for deliberating on issues that are 
specifically pertinent for women and are tabooed in gender mixed spaces. Moreover, 
organizing the women separately is part of a longer term struggle against the deeply rooted 
and long standing patriarchal patterns (Calderon & Smukler, 2004: 296). BLW is based in 
the informal settlements, where people live. This is important, because most of the women 
who participate cannot afford the bus-fare to come somewhere far away for a meeting. This 
is also why they place the BLW meetings in different locations on different days. The forums 
are local and locally organized, this also entails that they work with local issues and not only 
general issues (Ruth Mumbi, field notes). Bunge la Wamama does not initiate economic 
activities, they do advocacy and have had success in convincing decision-makers to improve 
the conditions for example on the labor rights of dhobi workers (laundresses), girls safety in 
the neighborhood and free sanitary towels for secondary school girls (Ruth Mumbi, 
recording) additionally they do more general campaigns, for example Warembo Ni Yes 
(Young women vote yes) a national community education campaign leading up to the 
constitutional referendum in 2010. Complementarily, some of the local groups of dhobi 
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workers (laundresses) that came together through BLW organized as saving-groups, 
pooling their resources to buy ironers. They now rent a shelter to work in and are saving for 
a washing machine (Emily Kwamboka, field notes). Other local groups formed as CBOs do 
community counseling, host NGO trainings and organize safe houses for community women 
who want to register offences  and risk further abuse by the perpetrators (Beatrice Amanti, 
recording). 
In BLW, the pertinent issues are different. The gender separation allows for issues that can 
be taboo in gender mixed settings as for example safety pads and sexual harassment and 
allows the women to share and deliberate on their experiences of women’s life in the Kenyan 
society. They organize the dhobi workers, to be able to supports them in case of work place 
abuse, as well as distribute the work and ease the workload. BLW has a strong focus on 
advocacy. In relation to the rights of the dhobi workers they allied with the Fahamu network32 
and made a video documentation33 and a lobby strategy for regulation (Emily Kwamboka, 
recording). Another issue the BLW have advocated on is free sanitary pads for school girls 
- an issue mentioned by many female activists often in comparison with free condoms. BLM 
brought the issue up in Parliament and got access to run a radio program which was 
broadcasted in several informal settlements, and they won: “We got a politician to listen and 
we got free sanitary pads for girls in secondary school” (Vicky Atieno, recording). Adding to 
the concrete local change, such political wins are important for motivating political 
engagement and credibility of the activists. Through such territorial organizing the BLM 
activists develop strong bonds of trust and confidence from the community members to the 
organizers and between the community members. These relationships are basis for other 
political mobilization, which I will discuss below.  
An advantage of the grassroots assemblies, as for example in the BLW and in Huruma 
where Get to Green are based, compared to the BLM is that they combine the immediate 
needs of the people for example for an income or protection with the political education and 
action through the praxis of conscientization . As this is also the aim in BLM Jeevanjee 
Gardens, the needs/issues are often even more concrete and immediately pertinent on a 
                                            
32  A social justice CSO network, which supports social movements through documentation, 
education and programming.  
33 See ‘Kilio Cha Wamama’ on: http://www.fahamu.org/multimedia 14.01.14 
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local level. The grassroots assemblies are closer tied to the immediately felt needs of ‘the 
ordinary people’, this gives the BLM activists access to a group of citizens that are not likely 
to come to the BLM Jeevanjee for social (lack of political interest or awareness) or economic 
reasons. Hence people often join the grassroots assemblies for social rather than political 
reasons. Where people come to Jeevanjee to deliberate, they typically come to the 
grassroots assembly because of an immediate problem. In the latter situation, on several 
occasions, I observed an expectation that the BLM activists were NGO workers and the 
people of the grassroots assemblies would often accuse the BLM activist of lack of empathy 
for their situation and/or expectations of grants or service delivery (an observation confirmed 
by Patita Tongoi, recording; and Hearn, 2007). The role of the experienced activists is then 
to facilitate a process of conscientization through the BLM praxis. 
6.2 Seizing a Window of Opportunity  
As the initiatives described above constitute longer term and close relationship between the 
core activists and the communities, the BLM activists also frequently react to injustice in 
other communities, on request. The activists immerse themselves into relevant situations 
and fill in as they identify needs. This may be as grassroots lawyers, squatting or rallying 
alongside the community members.  
One example occurred in the last days of my field trip, visiting BLM in Mombasa with Francis 
Sakwa, a core activist from the BLM Jeevanjee. The council workers were entering their 
second month of strike. The morning we passed the city hall, the five leaders had been 
arrested in the morning. The five union leaders had been called to the court in the morning 
and immediately arrested for disturbing the public space and incitement. Within ten minutes 
after the arrest the Magistrate had ‘lost’ the paper-work; it meant that the arrested could not 
be released on bail and were taken to the prison. A roaring ovation rolled through the square 
as one of the union leaders, a buxom middle-aged woman in a colorful kanga, raised her 
fists through the tarpaulin sealing of the truck that took the arrested away to detention. We 
stayed around the square, where the hundreds of striking council workers were grouping 
and the local BLM member, who was walking with us, started mingling.  
Freire emphasizes the importance of organizing with rather than for the ordinary people 
(Freire, 1993: 144-5; 49). By waiting for the workers to invite him, Sakwa got leverage to 
lead them in this situation in spite of their lack of prior knowledge of him. While waiting, 
Sakwa was constantly calling his network of activists and media, framing to mobilize support. 
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It turned out that, by coincidence, Chief Justice Willie Mutunga was conducting a ceremony 
next door. Not allowed to enter the ceremony a still larger group convened in the 
conversation where Sakwa and his local peer, Sharif were deliberating. By connecting the 
constitutional breach and the presence of Chief Justice Willie Mutunga next door, and 
ensuring Mutunga’s patronage to fair governance and his membership of the BLM, they 
formulated the injustice and the solution with and for the striking workers. In doing this, they 
were actively framing the narrative of the situation through the discussions among the 
striking workers. The striking workers had lost their elected leadership, with the arrests and 
as they had ad hoc reorganized there were still a vacuum, which Sakwa temporarily filled: 
After long and intense negotiations with the police guards of the meeting with Chief Justice 
Willie Mutunga, a delegation of five were allowed to enter and meet with Mutunga. After the 
meeting with Mutunga and the Magistrate, the crowd convened around a platform which 
Sakwa and a local organizer entered. They had got the release form for the arrested and 
explained the process and the success. Sakwa used the space to compliment CJ Mutunga 
and ensured the crowd that CJ is sympathizing with and actively engaging in the struggle 
for justice and rule of law; and that he, moreover, encourages the workers to continue the 
strike and the struggle, to organize. And that Mutunga admitted to be member of BLM and 
a concerned citizen of Kenya. Finally, he linked their strike to the structural injustice across 
the society and the need for the ordinary citizens to unite and demand accountable and just 
governance. Afterwards people surrounded Sakwa, to hear him and the others retell the 
story, to thank him and to network. For every ‘new crowd’ he kept referring to the constitution 
and explained the steps of how they had negotiated with the police and the other authorities, 
retelling the process and encouraging them to read the constitution closely. He showed them 
the key paragraphs and referred to the local BLM activists.  
As all social action can be perceived as learning processes, it is often tacit and only fully 
flourish when verbalized (Foley, 1998). When Sakwa debriefed the process by breaking 
down what, why and how they proceeded he explicated the learning process and the role 
as activist or revolutionary leader as a facilitator of learning. After an hour or so, Sakwa felt 
we could leave. Before that he had discussed the follow up process through with some 
experienced organizers from the union and from the local Bunge branches which had arrived 
during the day. After some weeks he returned to do a constitutional training for the union 
and that they had followed up with pressing charges against the magistrate for unlawful 
conduct.  
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This serves as an example on how the practice of BLM is internalized and grows to be an 
identity. Sakwa, with the peer Sharif, facilitated his emergence into the striking crowd, 
leveling with the participants in the situation “I am a council worker”. Building trustful 
relationships are essential in organizing. He waited to be invited and left it to Sharif and other 
locals to develop the relationship and legitimize his own participation simultaneously, by 
showing his knowledge on the process, the constitutions and ties to decision-makers, here 
CJ Mutunga. The example demonstrated core ingredients when transformational situated 
learning includes social contact and intimacy; respectful interactions; being expected to be 
capable in a situation; and decision and choice (Apte 2003a:116 in Apte 2009: 185). As this 
was an example of utilizing a ‘window of opportunity’ it shows how the activists initiate 
actions on injustice they meet. 
6.3 Unga Revolution - Escalating a Political Practice 
As the last example of how the social transformation processes work in the Kenyan society 
outside of the BLM I have chosen to analyze the case of Unga Revolution. Unga Revolution 
(UR) is a long term campaign that sprung from the BLM. Under the banner ‘Unga 30 bob34’, 
the campaign focuses on ensuring basic needs from all Kenyans from a right based 
approach. This implies the full implementation of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of 
Kenya, particularly Article 43: Economic and 
Social Rights, Unga is the name for maize 
flour, the stable food in Kenya. The campaign 
emerged from the BLM deliberations in 2005 
in response to the rapid rise in the price for 
maize flour during the Kibaki regime35. In 2008 
Kenyans experienced another wave of rapid 
rise in living costs and members of Bunge la 
Mwananchi reinvigorated the campaign 
collaborating with local assemblies, focusing 
                                            
34 Vernacular reference to Kenya Shilling 
35 In 2005, 3 years into the Kibaki regime, the price of maize meal had shot from KES 27 to 47. It 
was in a Bunge la Mwananchi debate that one of the members pointed out that the price of unga 
had raised by KES 24 during Moi’s 24 years in power, an average of 1 shilling per year. From that, 
the slogan Unga 30 bob emerged (http://ungarevolution.org/?p=1215 14.02.14) 
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on community deliberations, popular mobilization and media appealing events. For example 
they congregated at Harambee Avenue, in front of the President and Prime ministers offices, 
daily at lunchtime making noise with empty plates and renamed the avenue ‘Unga Avenue’36. 
The protests coincided with protests across the world in reaction to the global financial crisis. 
And the government did react, introducing subsidized Unga family packages37. My fieldtrip 
in 2013 was during the first annual budget process of the new government, and the focus of 
Unga Revolution was to push for VAT tax exemption on basic commodities. This similar to 
earlier focused on popular education and campaign advocacy. A number of community 
events took place in trains, football stadiums and at local assemblies; other activities were 
delivering petitions, public meetings and rallies.  
Claiming that demonstrators are paid to rally by foreign organizations or political opponents 
is a widespread tactic to undermine the legitimacy of political mobilizations by the targeted 
duty bearers (observations; Patita Tingoi, recording), this, for example was the case during 
the Occupy Parliament demonstration where rumors that the President paid the organizers 
because he shared an interest in preventing the pay raise for the Members of Parliament 
demotivated some people from participating. This tendency is one reason for a founding 
principle for the UR is not to allow merchandise such as printed t-shirts and banners, 
because they do not want to be dependent on funding, be vulnerable to claims that they are 
‘paid to protest’. At the same time they do not want to be separated from the ordinary people 
when they are in the streets. The economic aspect is a real concern for people who live off 
casual labor, to go to the streets for a full day means losing the income of the day. Every 
assembly or rally ends by taking a round of contribution for those who cannot pay for 
transport. Moreover BLM has developed Unganishawa, which is registered as a CBO. It 
functions both as a legal body to administer funds granted to non-registered social 
movements such as BLM and UR. It has a fund to cover transport in critical situations and 
bonds and bail for less well knows activists, who cannot get support for such expenses by 
the international human rights NGO’s (Francis Sakwa, recording).   
In these mobilizations BLM mobilize with a number of organizations – Consumers’ 
Federation of Kenya (COFEK), Fahamu – network for social justice and the celebrity activist 
                                            
36 http://ungarevolution.org/?page_id=614 
37  A 2 kg packet for KES 80 and the Mwananchi’s 5kg packet for KES 130 
http://ungarevolution.org/?page_id=614 14.03.14 
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Boniface Mwangi being some of the major partners. As mentioned in chapter five, it is a 
recurring challenge for the BLM to collaborate with ‘mainstream CSO’, some of the reasons 
being their unwillingness to compromise on the form and principles of organizing. The Unga 
Revolution has a horizontal leadership structure, Core convener Florence Kanyua explains: 
“Learning from what has happened [in BLM] we decided to do this other movement 
differently.” …“In Unga Revolution we decided that we would not have anybody who poses 
as the overall boss. This is because that will make the movement not grow because some 
people will be feeling that they are senior than others. So we decided instead of having a 
chairman or director, it is the people who participate in it as leaders who will become all core 
conveners. So we are several core conveners from different committees. This means that 
we are equal. So you may find somebody who wants to pose as the leader of that group but 
the leadership is a committee of several people and all of them are core conveners.”  
(Florence Kanyua, recording). 
Apart from being politically motivated the horizontal leadership also a security aspect, the 
‘leaderless structure’ lessens the risk of infiltration by the state. In this, it resembles the 
movements presented in chapter three. The political reasoning is to avoid that the 
revolutionary leadership turns into bureaucracy as Kanyua explains in the quote above 
(Freire, 1993). Leaders are not elected, but people that are particularly active in the activities 
are invited to join the organizing committees. The group gave me the examples of the first 
encounter with Ruth Mumbi, how they heard about this young woman After the organizers 
had been arrested, at a big rally in Huruma, she had picked up the banner and continued 
the march to the front. After such happenings people are typically invited to the organizing 
committees and are allocated more or less formal mentors among the more experienced 
activists, as introduced above. The decentralized leadership allows for the movement to 
develop. Looking at the mobilizing committee they represent the different geographically 
and identity based communities of the movement. Unga Revolution is the unifying initiative, 
through which they seek to reframe the struggle, from being based on tribes to be based on 
class (Patita Tingoi, recording; Francis Sakwa, field notes). The Unga Revolution has joined 
the numerous communities connected to BLM, building on the communities’ experiences of 
organizing and the relationships developed in the local activities. The UR is hence an 
example of how to build popular power through joining the different struggles that is their 
multi-centered analysis, which can further the development of a machine of struggle. Hence 
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this illuminates how important the local organizing is for the Unga Revolution in order to 
demonstrate its popular support. 
6.4 Sum up 
The political mobilization by the BLM can be understood as based on a multi-centered 
analysis as they react in active solidarity with all oppressed groups. In these encounters 
they perform revolutionary leadership in Freire’s terminology – they facilitate processes of 
reflection through deliberations and action and through organizing and mobilizing. They 
achieve a praxis through which people can develop a critical awareness and an ability to 
take action against their own oppressed situation. They show several examples of political 
victories through campaigning, which help to build alliances. They build up trust in 
relationships both to government officials such as police units and officers but also to local 
right holder groups such as street children and street workers, hawkers and dhobi workers, 
youth groups or residents of a certain area. Through locally affiliated conveners these 
groups become the constituencies and base of mobilization for the unifying campaign Unga 
Revolution.  
Joining these different constituencies from different oppressed groups in the Unga 
Revolution, characterized by a horizontal and amorphous leadership structure – defined by 
initiative - can be seen as a prefigurative practice and moreover, a model for building a 
‘machine of struggle’ from below. It draws on a multi-centered analysis and combined with 
the horizontal leadership structure, it provides a radically different way of organizing which 
may serve as a model for participatory institutions. In line with the theoretical framework of 
Nail (2010) and Freire (1993) the organization may be said to hold a revolutionary potential 
- it is radically different from the reigning political culture in Kenya and contributes to a radical 
praxis of facilitating conscientization. 
7 Conclusion  
This thesis sprang from a curiosity towards Kenyan political culture and the space for and 
practice of political participation by the ordinary people. The space for political participation 
in Kenya has been greatly repressed in periods of Kenya’s recent history and even though 
it is gradually opening up, it is still restricted. As Kenya got a new and progressive 
constitution in 2010, as the judicial democracy was reinstated through this it is still in a 
process of implementation and even more so, if we talk about a radicalized participatory 
democracy as is the focus of this report. 
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Bunge la Mwananchi (BLM) is drawing on pre-colonial traditions of critical public 
deliberation, engaging in present politics and governance processes and inviting inspiration 
from across classes and borders. On that basis, this thesis places BLM as a strategic site - 
a critical case - to study the development of a radical and relevant African democracy. In 
exploring the BLM practice, I have drawn on Paulo Freire to provide a vocabulary for 
understanding the development of critical awareness among ordinary citizens and a sense 
of ability in the individuals. I combine this emancipatory praxis with Thomas Nail’s framework 
for analyzing strategic spaces for radical political transformation. On this basis, this thesis 
sought to answer the following research question: 
How can the BLM practice be understood as a praxis of conscientization and how can this 
process be understood as a strategy for social transformation? 
To answer the research question I deconstructed the BLM practice, in order to analyze it as 
an emancipatory praxis. In Freire’s terminology, praxis refers to the combination of action 
and reflection which, when rooted in the ordinary people’s own experiences of oppression, 
can facilitate concientizacion - the development of critical awareness and sense of ability to 
act against oppression. BLM is here understood as including the crowd in Jeevanjee 
Gardens and the related movements such as “the Unga Revolution”, “Get to Green” and 
“Bunge la Wamama” etc. Moreover, in this thesis, I have focused on the political core of the 
BLM - those that perceive the BLM as a social movement. To this group, the critical public 
deliberation are interlinked with and offset for political mobilization and other forms of direct 
action. This dialectical process can be understood as a praxis in Freire’s terminology.  
In chapter five, this thesis found that BLM practice facilitates an inclusive space for critical 
deliberation in the public sphere, with strong norms of inclusiveness and horizontalism. 
Scholars of participatory democracy often argue that none is born a perfect democrat, but it 
has to be learned (Hansen, 2008). Looking at the political history of Kenya, the need for 
democratic citizens’ education becomes no less relevant. Through participation, in BLM the 
people learn tools and skills for organizing, leadership and public speaking, but it is also a 
transformative learning process where people develop a critical awareness based on their 
own social reality and a sense of agency, to feel able to affect it. Hence BLM becomes a 
form of popular education.  
Looking to the practices of BLM as a model for social mobilization for a relevant, radical 
democracy, what can one learn? The BLM practice is this constant dialogue, that constitutes 
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an often open ended ‘negotiation of meaning’, in which problems are processed collectively. 
Hence the BLM can be said to reflect the non-normative character, as Nail describes for the 
participatory institutions or communities. The fundamental values of the BLM are therefore 
more process oriented, and as they are constantly negotiated, there is also a highly 
institutionalized norm of equal access and inclusiveness. Through the participating 
members, and not least the constant flow of newcomers due to the open membership 
structure, BLM reflects the surrounding society, and oppressive mechanisms based for 
example on gender, age or sexuality. However, such mechanisms are addressed and 
challenged openly through the deliberative practice in a ‘war of ideas’ yet still framed by the 
fundamental values of inclusiveness and equality and hence contributing the development 
of a radical democratic practice.  
Another aspect of the inclusive structure is the ‘incorporation of the oppressors’, echoing 
Freire core activists argue that this is a necessity for social transformation. I find that while 
the BLM practice the principle of including oppressors – government infiltrators or police 
keeping watch - the above practice of equal access and inclusiveness is simultaneously a 
necessity and a challenge to the BLM transparent praxis. Government infiltrators, openly as 
well as tacit, are an actively calculated part of the deliberative practice in Jeevanjee with the 
impetus of facilitating conscientization with all groups, This, however, makes it difficult for 
BLM to plan and strategize. As a consequence, I also experienced a practice of a more 
selectively invited space, where political actions are planned and strategized, such as the 
leadership committees of the Unga Revolution, which one should prove a dedication to the 
struggle to be invited to. It is clear, that it is not without problems to have a practice of 
inclusiveness in a context of government oversight and mistrust. 
 “Revolutionary leadership must be pedagogical work” (Freire, 1993: 49) and the 
experienced participants take this responsibility upon them, as they become facilitators of 
this transformative learning process and framing the dialogue in accordance with the 
fundamental principles and connecting the everyday experiences to a structural level of 
societal analysis. These are both in the deliberations in the BLM in Jeevanjee gardens but 
also in other strategic sites, such as demonstrations or emerging situations of oppression. 
This is done by taking leadership and facilitating radical responses to oppressive situations 
in their everyday at large.  
I have mentioned several examples where BLM’s efforts has resulted in improvements for 
ordinary people, for example the residents of Muthurwa Estate, who via BLM became aware 
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of their rights and possibilities in the new constitution, and won the law suit against the state, 
so they retained the right to most of their land for residence. Through organizing, educating 
and mobilizing they managed to make a difference for themselves and the country. 
Practicing a politics of difference based on a multi-centered analysis BLM react in active 
solidarity with all oppressed groups. These actions lead to a stronger level of organization 
of communities, based on the BLM practice, which become the constituencies and base of 
mobilization for the unifying campaign Unga Revolution. Unga Revolution is designed to join 
the different struggles in BLM and reframe the indignation to a class based analysis. With 
reference to Nail, it is of highest importance that the class struggle here becomes a focus 
point and not a means of legitimizing other mechanisms of oppression in the struggle, which 
is to some level addressed through a reinforcement of the principles of inclusion and equality 
inherited from BLM Jeevanjee.  
The constant and open ended ‘negotiation of meaning’ in BLM in Jeevanjee Gardens 
invariably results in multiplicities of ideologies for example in terms of leadership structure. 
I find that there seem to have developed two parallel structures leadership in BLM Jeevanjee 
Gardens: on one side the amorphous horizontal practice and on the other a representative 
leadership, which must be seen as a token on the non-normative organization framed by 
the basic values of inclusiveness and coherency rather than an ideology. The ‘activist core’ 
of BLM have with the engagement in Unga Revolution continued and radicalized the 
principles of horizontal organizing and leadership without static or formalized leaders which 
allow for more coherent mobilization. Without valuing one form of organizing over the other, 
both have aspects of organizing that are continuing different strand of a radical praxis of 
facilitating concientizacion. Hence, I see both as radically different from the reigning political 
culture in Kenya and can be seen as a front of a model for a machine of struggle, as 
described by Nail (2010). 
In conclusion, the exploration of BLM as a practice of radical democracy and a social 
movement pushing for transformative change, there are inherent challenges from infiltration 
as well as latent micro-fascist tendencies. As these are addressed, in a potential up-scaling 
of the BLM activities, special attention must be paid to these aspects. However, despite 
challenges I find that BLM must be seen as proposing a number of practices that can inform 
us on the development of a radical and relevant democratic praxis and an interlinked push 
for social transformation. Hence I conclude that through the deliberative practice BLM are 
framing rights in the struggle to develop democracy.  
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9 Appendix  
Attached on CD rom 
Appendix A: Recordings of interviews and selected group conversations (appended on 
DVD). 
Appendix B: Interview guides 
Appendix C: Field notes 
Appendid D: Field calender 
